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In framing a government, which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the gov-
ernment to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to
control itself.1
Might and right do differ frightfully from hour to hour; but give
them centuries to try it in, they are found to be identical.2
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 25, 1985, Miguel Alvarez was arrested and charged
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.3 Three days later
Alvarez appeared before a federal magistrate for a bond hearing.4
Present at this hearing was a representative from American Bankers
Insurance Company, a bonding company. The magistrate set bond at
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 265 (A. Hamilton) (M. Beloff ed. 1948) (2d ed. 1987).
2. T. CARLYLE, CHARTISM 8 (1839).
3. See United States v. One Single Family Residence ("Alvarez"), 683 F. Supp. 783, 785
(S.D. Fla. 1988).
4. Id.
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fifty thousand dollars.' In accordance with the magistrate's findings,6
American Bankers issued Alvarez the fifty thousand dollar bond in
return for a contingent promissory note from him and a mortgage for
the same amount on his home.7
Approximately six months after Alvarez's arrest, and before his
scheduled trial, the government instituted separate, but parallel, civil
forfeiture proceedings against Alvarez's home,' pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(7) (1988), 9 the same home that the magistrate had deter-
mined Alvarez could offer as security for his bond, and in which
American Bankers had taken its security interest. Under the statute,
5. Id.
6. "The Magistrate set a $50,000 corporate surety bond. She also determined that
Alvarez had about $50,000 equity in his home, and that a hearing pursuant to United States v.
Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), was unnecessary." Alvarez, 683 F. Supp. at 785. This
fact is significant because the purpose of a Nebbia hearing is to determine whether or not the
source of the defendant's bond suggests that he has sufficient interest in the security that the
risk of flight is actually decreased by its posting. Nebbia, 357 F.2d at 304. The establishment
of ownership and the threat of losing one's home meets this level of reliability.
American Bankers tried to argue that the government was equitably estopped from
bringing the forfeiture action because American Bankers had relied on the magistrate's finding
that the house would be acceptable security for the bond and further, that an Assistant United
States Attorney had "affirmatively assured it that Alvarez' house would not be subject to
forfeiture." Alvarez, 683 F. Supp. at 789. The court rejected these arguments, stating that, at
the outset, "[e]quitable estoppel cannot be asserted against the United States regarding actions
it takes in its sovereign capacity." Id. at 789-90. Furthermore, it found that "[e]ven if such an
assurance was made, this conversation took place after the United States had filed the instant
forfeiture action." Id. at 790.
Neither of these responses adequately addresses the question of whether or not American
Bankers' reliance on the magistrate's finding was reasonable in the absence of any collusion
between American Bankers and Alvarez. The invocation of sovereign immunity does not
provide a justification for the government's actions. Rather, it represents the government
taking the position that it declines to justify its actions because it does not have to do so.
7. Alvarez, 683 F. Supp. at 790.
8. Id. at 785.
9. Section 881(a)(7) states:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them: ....
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances
or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of a violation of this title punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) (emphasis added) (The clause following the italicized portion of
the statute is the "innocent owner" exception to the provision.). The Comprehensive Forfei-
ture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-743, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57, added this section, which consol-
idated the civil and criminal forfeiture statutes for drug-related violations and significantly
expanded the categories of forfeitable property.
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the presence of cocaine in the house' ° rendered it forfeitable to the
government."
On June 9, 1986, Alvarez failed to appear for his scheduled hear-
ing.' 2 Consequently, American Bankers paid the fifty thousand dollar
bond to the government.' 3 The bonding company then intervened in
the forfeiture proceeding to claim its interest in Alvarez's house.' 4
The district court in the forfeiture proceeding denied American Bank-
ers's claim, holding that the company should have known when it
took the house as security that it was subject to forfeiture, 5 and
10. Presumably, the cocaine was found in Alvarez's closet as a result of a search
conducted under a warrant. At least one hopes so. The case does not address this question.
There is some precedent, however, that even evidence which is illegally, or at least
questionably, obtained will be admissable for purposes of civil forfeiture, where it would not be
in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530 (1926) (noting that
forfeiture seizures may be made by persons unauthorized to seize the property if the
government "adopts" the seizure by later instituting forfeiture proceedings); LaChance v.
Drug Enforcement Admin., 672 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding forfeiture of $49,000
in cash where DEA agents' probable cause to seize cash was established after the fact of
seizure by a drug sensitive dog's reaction to the cash).
11. See supra note 9. The exact manner in which the statute calls for forfeiture of the
house may not be immediately obvious. While certainly the house may be instrumental in
concealing a large amount of cocaine and thus is "used... to facilitate the commission" of a
violation pursuant to section 881, the house is presumably also where Alvarez lived. The
cocaine's presence there may have been as much a matter of convenience as necessity. It is not
necessary to the government's theory that the house play any truly instrumental role in
facilitating the crime; rather the civil forfeiture provision is based on a theory that the house is
"tainted" by the presence of contraband. See infra notes 26-30 & 192-97 and accompanying
text.
12. Alvarez, 683 F. Supp. at 785.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 789. In a civil forfeiture action, once the government has established probable
cause for forfeiture (which in this case was established by the presence of the cocaine), the
burden shifts to the claimant to prove that he is an "innocent owner." United States v. A
Single Family Residence ("Heidi"), 803 F.2d 625, 629 (1lth Cir. 1986) (stating that "[o]nce
the government demonstrates that probable cause exists, the burden of proof in a civil
forfeiture proceeding shifts to the claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the property is not subject to forfeiture"); see also United States v. Trotter, 912 F.2d 964, 965
(8th Cir. 1990) (discussing the burden shifting in civil forfeiture cases).
Section 881 defines an "innocent owner" as one who neither consented to nor was aware
of the illegal use of his property. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988); see supra note 9. This
definition is generally applied to a person who already owns the property when the alleged
illegal use takes place. American Bankers could not claim innocent owner status because its
interest arose after the illegal use of the property. In addition, it was aware of the possibility of
this use by virtue of the charges against Alvarez. Therefore, American Bankers tried to qualify
as a bona fide purchaser for value, a category of innocent owner not explicitly provided for in
the civil forfeiture statute, but one which is found in the criminal forfeiture statutes. See 21
U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(6)(B) (1988). In spite of the absence of an
explicit protection for bona fide purchasers for value, the court found that "the innocent owner
exception ... also protects bona fide purchasers for value." Alvarez, 683 F. Supp. at 788. It
then went on, though, to conflate the bona fide purchaser exception with the innocent owner
1991]
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granted summary judgment for the government. As a result of this
ruling, the government gained both the fifty thousand dollars from the
bond and the house.16 The court rationalized that the government's
double recovery was justified because, otherwise, "the criminal
defendant... [would] get something for nothing, as the property he
offers as security may already be independently owed to the govern-
ment due to the forfeiture statutes."
17
This statement is disturbing at several levels. First, as a practical
exception, and held that a bona fide purchaser must also prove that he has done everything
possible to prevent his property from being used for an illegal purpose. Id. This makes no
sense. It is illogical to require a bona fide purchaser to show that he took measures to prevent
an illegal use that occurred before he acquired the property.
16. The government probably received only the fifty thousand dollars of equity that
Alvarez had in the house, because typically in these cases, the government pays off the lender
who holds the mortgage. It is important to note that it is not required to do so by the statute.
Even a mortgage lender's security interest may be invalidated if the government takes the
position that the lender "should have known" that the borrower was a drug dealer. See United
States v. One Single Family Residence ("Republic Bank"), 731 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (holding the bank's $800,000 lien invalid because the evidence suggested complicity with
the drug dealer borrower on the part of the bank). The Miami Herald, in reporting on the
Republic Bank case, predicted that the ruling would "redefine the 'standard of conduct' for
banks in making loans to customers they suspect are drug dealers." Republic Bank Loses
Interest in Drug House, Miami Herald, Mar. 9, 1990, at Cl, col. 4., continued at C3, col. 3.
That statement is inexplicable because Republic Bank's conduct in making the loan was not in
accord with generally accepted banking practice. See Republic Bank, 731 F. Supp. at 1571.
Therefore, theoretically, the court's holding should have no impact on banking practices.
However, insofar as the power to exact civil forfeiture is so plenary, bankers may fear that even
adhering to normal banking procedures will not protect their security interests. They may,
therefore, be encouraged either to do extensive background checks on prospective borrowers,
or to refuse to grant loans to persons on the grounds of mere suspicion. The first option is
costly and the second raises the specter of a denial of equal protection should banks
discriminate on the basis of race or ethnic background. See Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties
and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 480-81
(1976) (describing problems for lenders in screening borrowers).
The determination of whether a particular claimant "should have known" he was dealing
with a drug trafficker turns out to be, as a practical matter, one of prosecutorial discretion,
despite the fact that it may appear to be an objective, "reasonableness" standard. If a
prosecutor thinks the owner in question should have known about the drugs, a forfeiture
action will be brought. If he does not, it is likely that a release of the property will be
negotiated. Given that the question of whether someone "should have known" can be a
subjective one, the standard allows the prosecutors an enormous amount of flexibility in its
application. By bringing a forfeiture action in a borderline case, a prosecutor essentially shifts
the burden onto a claimant to prove a negative (lack of knowledge) by a preponderance of the
evidence. If the owner did not know of an illegal use, it is difficult to know what sort of proof
he can offer, other than his testimony, that he did not know. However, if a court determines
that a claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof he can expect no mercy. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has stated its position as follows: "[T]hose
who knowingly do business with drug dealers do so at their own risk." United States v. Four
Million Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 905 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
17. Alvarez, 683 F. Supp. at 789.
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matter, how is the government's goal of preventing criminal defend-
ants from "getting something for nothing" advanced by imposing
what amounts to a fifty thousand dollar fine on American Bankers?
Alvarez already had obtained the benefit of ownership of the house in
that he had used it to post the bond and then taken the opportunity
the bond afforded him to flee. The court's ruling in this case did not
"prevent" Alvarez from getting anything. There was no issue of
American Bankers colluding in some manner with Alvarez. Denial of
American Bankers's claim, under the circumstances, is rather like
closing the barn door after the horse has gone.
If the court meant to suggest that in the future, persons charged
with drug violations should not be able to obtain bond, this statement
is even more troublesome.Is How is a court to determine at the bond
stage whether a defendant's assets are forfeitable if this determination
depends upon a finding on the very crime with which the defendant is
charged? Alvarez had not been convicted of anything when the gov-
ernment instituted civil forfeiture proceedings. Yet, the court appar-
ently did not have any hesitation in finding that his house was
"independently owed to the government." 19 There is something fun-
damentally wrong with this ruling. Section 881 allows the govern-
ment to seek forfeiture of property "used, or intended to be used" to
commit "violation[s] ... punishable by more than one year's impris-
onment."'2 Thus, in spite of the "civil" label, forfeiture under section
881 looks like punishment for a crime. How can the government
obtain forfeiture from someone under this statute without proving
that they committed "a violation"? Worse, how is it that, through
18. It may be that the court means to advance the government's goal by making it
impossible for people accused of drug violations to post bond. If, as the court wiote, a
"reasonable" bonding company "would have fully apprised itself of the allegations against
Alvarez," id. presumably leading it to decline to issue the bond, the court is suggesting that
any person charged with a drug violation should not be able to obtain bond from a
"reasonable" bonding company. That would mean that persons, otherwise able to obtain a
bond, would be punished merely for being charged with drug violations. Such a practice
smacks of a determination of guilt before conviction. The government has a legitimate interest
in seeing that criminals do not use ill-gotten gains to post bond and then fle-as Alvarez did.
That interest, however, is in direct conflict with the accused's constitutional rights. This case
poses precisely the same dilemma presented by the relation-back provision of the criminal
forfeiture statutes which serves to deprive those accused under these statutes of their counsel of
choice. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2670 n.7 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing stripping of economic power prior to conviction as
"constitutionally suspect"); Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and
the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 765 (1989).
19. Alvarez, 683 F. Supp. at 789.
20. See supra note 9.
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this statute, forfeiture may be imposed upon American Bankers, a
party not even charged with the commission of any offense?
The answers to these questions are complex and require the
explanation of two threshold concepts: the in rem proceeding and the
"taint" doctrine. First, because a civil forfeiture is an action in rem-
that is, an action against a thing, not a person-the government need
not prove that the owner committed the violation which supposedly
justifies the forfeiture.21 The property is the defendant.22  "It ... is
proceeded against,... held guilty and condemned as though it were
conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. 2 3 This "personifica-
tion fiction" 24 is the central concept that informs the in rem aspect of
civil forfeiture. Because the property, and not its owner, is the
"defendant," it is only the property's "guilt" that is at issue and
"]udicial inquiry into the guilt or innocence of the owner [can] be
dispensed with."25 Since an inanimate object cannot "commit" a
21. "[I]t is this historic characterization [as actions in rem] which permits admiralty
forfeitures, and civil forfeitures in general, to escape the stricture of the due process provisions
of the fifth amendment." United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 1982)
(distinguishing civil from criminal forfeiture); see also United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911,
916 (3rd Cir. 1981).
22. The practice of personifying the property to be forfeited as the defendant results in
humorous and cumbersome case styles. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring
v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); In re Various Items of Personal Property, 282 U.S. 577
(1931); United States v. 1,960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814); United States v.
One 1983 Homemade Vessel Named Barracuda, 858 F.2d 643 (1 1th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred and Fifty Dollars, 758 F.2d 553 (lth Cir. 1985);
United States v. One Blue Lobster Vessel Named Tony, Jr., 639 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Fla. 1986);
United States v. 3,210 Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus Yacare, 636 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.
Fla. 1986); United States v. One Black Horse, 129 F. 167 (D. Me. 1904); United States v. One
Condominium Apartment, 636 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Fla. 1986). This list presents a most
improbable collection of "defendants."
When shortened, some of these case styles become at best confusing, and at worst
indistinguishable. Therefore, throughout this Comment, I have given cases a short name
where a reference to the case name would not be helpful. For example, there are at least three
separate cases discussed in this Comment that could be reduced to United States v. One Single
Family Residence. E.g., United States v. One Single Family Residence ("Aguilera"), 894 F.2d
1511 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. A Single Family Residence ("Heidi"), 803 F.2d 625
(11 th Cir. 1986); United States v. One Single Family Residence ("Alvarez"), 683 F. Supp. 783
(S.D. Fla. 1988).
23. Various Items of Personal Property, 282 U.S. at 581. The in rem characterization of a
civil forfeiture proceeding is a legal fiction that "ascrib[es] to the property a certain
personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong." J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
24. At least one commentator has described the procedural posture of a civil forfeiture
proceeding as the "personification fiction." Note, Bane ofAmerican Forfeiture Law-Banished
at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768 (1977). As the term is particularly apt, this comment uses
it throughout.
25. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974). With the
codification of the innocent owner defense, this statement is not strictly true. See supra note 9
(text of § 881(a)(7)). However, because the burden is on the owner to prove his innocence, the
[Vol. 45:911
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"violation" of any laws, the fiction which describes the procedural
posture of the case merely begs the question. How does one go about
finding a property "guilty"?
Normally, in a civil forfeiture action, the property's "guilt" is
determined by the presence of some illegal substance that makes it
"tainted." The paradigmatic case is a car found to contain illegal
drugs.26 Under subsection (h) of section 881,27 title to forfeitable
property vests "in the United States upon commission of the act giv-
ing rise to forfeiture. ' 2  This subsection is the codification of the
common law doctrine of relation-back.29 The theory of relation-back
is that the property has been "tainted" by an illegal act, thereby trans-
ferring ownership to the government.a0 In the example above of a car
containing illegal drugs, the "illegal act" usually alleged is transporta-
tion of, and perhaps also intent to distribute, illegal drugs.
The civil posture of a forfeiture action is nothing more than a
procedural fiction. Inanimate objects do not commit acts, legal or
otherwise. And the "taint" doctrine sounds uncomfortably like a the-
ory of demonic possession a.3  Nevertheless, as a result of these fic-
tions, the government is free to exact forfeiture, not only from the
guilt or innocence of the owner may be dispensed with as a matter of what the government is
required to plead and prove. Furthermore, this Comment argues that the innocent owner
defense is more hypothetical than real and that it is this vision of the owner's conduct or
motives as irrelevant that still informs civil forfeiture doctrine. See infra notes 247-65 and
accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Corvette, 914 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990);
United States v. One 1982 Oldsmobile Cutlass, 709 F. Supp. 1542 (W.D. Okla. 1989); United
States v. One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, 644 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1986); United Statei v. One
Blue Lobster Vessel Named Tony, Jr., 639 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United States v. One
1977 36 Foot Cigarette Ocean Racer, 624 F. Supp. 290 (S.D. Fla. 1985); United States v. One
1981 Cadillac Eldorado, 535 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988) ("All right, title, and interest in property described in
subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving
rise to forfeiture under this section.").
28. Id.
29. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2653 (1989).
30. Id. As long ago as 1814, Justice Story, dissenting in United States v. 1,960 Bags of
Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814), stated about the relation-back doctrine:
If the principle ... be admitted in its full extent; it will be found very difficult to
bound it. A bale of goods which is once contaminated... will retain its noxious
quality through every successive transfer.... Yet such a position would strike us
as monstrous. [Tihe innocent purchaser would sink under the pressure of frauds
which he could never know, nor by diligence avert
Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
31. In a manner of speaking, by seeking forfeiture, the government is "exorcising" the
"guilty" property. Upon forfeiture, the property is immediately cleansed of its "taint" and is
free to be sold to the public-the government, of course, retaining the proceeds from the sale
as its just compensation for performing this valuable public service. The exception to this
practice is forfeiture of what constitutes contraband per se, that is, drugs, spoiled food, and the
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accused, but also from his family 32 and other innocent third parties,
without an adjudication of guilt, and no cry will be heard that this
action violates due process. By layering one legal fiction on top of
another, the court in Alvarez treated American Bankers' security as if
it never existed, even though American Bankers had committed no
crime. Astonishingly enough, the Alvarez court found this result to be
only "arguably harsh."
33
If the entire civil forfeiture construct sounds anachronistic, 34 it is
with good reason. The personification fiction is a legal device many
hundreds, if not thousands, of years old.35 Its survival is something of
like. Usually these items are destroyed. This is the only area in which the notion of "guilty"
property can be said to have any conceptual validity and symmetry.
32. There is a limited exception to the statement that the government may exact forfeiture
from innocent family members of a wrong-doer. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling that the government is not entitled to
forfeiture of property that is held as tenants by the entireties with an innocent spouse. United
States v. One Single Family Residence ("Aguilera"), 894 F.2d 1511 (1 th Cir. 1990); see also
United States v. Marks, 703 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (noting that a wife who owns by
virtue of entireties is not subject to forfeiture). Although this ruling clearly represents a
victory for those unjustly punished by the operation of the forfeiture statutes, it is too limited
to inspire much rejoicing. Even if all the other circuits adopt this holding, it will only apply in
those states that recognize estates by the entireties. "The tenancy by the entirety exists today
in somewhat less than half the states." J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 281 (1988).
Unfortunately, the analysis focuses formalistically on the form in which the property is held,
rather than on the propriety of visiting forfeiture on those accused of no crime. Furthermore,
because innocence is also a component, although not the determinative factor alone, it places
the burden on the claimant spouse to prove his innocence. How difficult is it to prove that one
did not know of the illegal activities of one's spouse? If the burden of proof reflects an
assumption that spouses are unlikely to be innocent, should not the government have to indict
and convict them too before inflicting a punishment on them?
33. United States v. One Single Family Residence ("Alvarez"), 683 F. supp. 783, 789 (S.D.
Fla. 1988) (emphasis added).
34. Civil forfeiture doctrine not only sounds absurd, but it also leads to absurd results. In
an action in rem, the court is presumed to have jurisdiction only when the property is within
the jurisdiction. Thus, in one case, the government brought civil forfeiture proceedings against
a plane in one jurisdiction, subsequently moved the plane to another jurisdiction for storage,
and then successfully argued, over vigorous dissents, that the claimant's appeal of the
forfeiture be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836
F.2d 1571 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204 (1988). The majority in One Lear
Jet Aircraft ignored the question of whether it had in personam jurisdiction over the claimant,
despite the in rem nature of the initial proceeding. One of the dissenting judges referred to this
reasoning as "dated jurisdictional jetsam." Id at 1580 (Vance, J., dissenting). He also noted
that "[t]he United States instigated the action. Having submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the court, the government should not be allowed to escape 'through its subsequent
jurisdictional exceptions' to claimants' appeal." Id. at 1579. It is important to point out that
the government did not challenge jurisdiction because it had made a mistake in bringing the
action, but rather because it had itself destroyed that jurisdiction. It is easy to see how this
precedent could lead to uncommonly silly results if the government could seek forfeiture and
then frustrate claimants by moving the property around the country. So far, there is no
evidence that the government is regularly attempting to take such a tack.
35. The idea that the notion of a "guilty" res is an ancient one is oft repeated and usually
[Vol. 45:911
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a legal "curiosity."36 It has been variously described as "repug-
nant,"37 a "perversion,"3 and "superstitious."3 9 In spite of these crit-
icisms, courts persist in invoking the fiction, principally on the
grounds of tradition.' Tradition alone, however, is a weak justifica-
tion indeed for retaining this much criticized form of action that
would appear to run afoul of our most basic principle of criminal jus-
tice-the presumption of innocence. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
courts have struggled to identify "new reasons more fitted to the
time[s],"'41 for this remnant of "the 'blind days' of feudalism."42
attributed to the following biblical quotation: "If an ox gore a man that he [shall] die, the ox
shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten." EXODUS 21:28-30, cited in Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.17 (1974). For a criticism of the reliance on
this biblical quotation as support for the personification fiction, see Finkelstein, The Goring Ox:
Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion
of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973).
36. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 170 (quoting C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 330 (7th
ed. 1964). The reference in the text is to the fiction as employed in the English common law
action of deodand. Deodand is often cited, somewhat erroneously, as the precursor to civil
forfeiture as applied today in the United States. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-82;
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971); United States v.
Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3rd Cir. 1987); United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385,
387-88 (W.D. Mich. 1987). For a discussion of the tenuous relationship of deodand to the
modem civil forfeiture action, see infra notes 73-108 and accompanying text.
37. Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 515, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916) (referring to
deodand and the personification fiction).
38. W. SEAGLE, THE QUEST FOR LAW 126 (1941) (referring to deodand).
39. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (citing I W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300). In the quotation in the text, Blackstone was calling
"superstitious" the "purpose" of deodand, not the personification fiction. He described this
purpose as being to use the funds collected through deodand to say masses for the souls of
those "snatched away by sudden death." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *301.
However, it seems sufficiently analogous to retain the reference.
40. See Beaudry v. United States, 79 F.2d 650, 650 (5th Cir. 1935) ("[I]n view of the
ancient and widespread application of the principle of a guilty res, (civil forfeiture is] not
thought to deny due process."); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 n.2 (E.D. Cal.
1982) (the historic characterization of civil forfeiture as in rem permits procedural escape from
the strictures of the fifth amendment); see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686; Goldsmith-
Grant, 254 U.S. at 511.
41. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
42. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721 (1971). The quote
in the text is often cited without the additional single quotes as it appears here. The Court is
citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300. The exact quote is "the blind days of
popery," and appears in the same paragraph as the quotation cited in supra note 39. Given the
English Reformation, and the subsequent attempts to suppress English Catholicism, the
substitution of "feudalism" for "popery" may distort the meaning somewhat for the modem
reader. The word "feudalism" is more suggestive of a political and economic system, one
characterized by the absolute power of the feudal lord, than of a religious practice. Blackstone
was criticizing the Catholic practice of paying for masses to be said "as an expiation" for the
souls of those who died a sudden death unshriven. In Blackstone's England, the term
"popery" had acquired some of the same negative associations the word "communism" has in
modern America. Nevertheless, the substitution has an ironic appropriateness, one that the
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These struggles have, however, been largely unproductive. Modern
rationales are also unpersuasive and tend to "reduce to the tautology
that civil cases are not criminal. '43  Thus, the question is squarely
posed: May the government avoid the procedural protections
afforded to a defendant in a criminal proceeding merely by labeling an
action "civil," when its purposes and structure are clearly penal?
There is little doubt that the principal purpose of civil forfeitures
in general, and section 881 in particular, is crime deterrence and pun-
ishment.' As such, they represent essentially penal sanctions, no
matter how they are labeled. 45 Nevertheless, as to American Bankers
and other innocent owners, the civil forfeiture statute acts as a form of
criminal strict liability. Given that most of our criminal law is based
on the concept of fault, to be established in an adversarial proceeding
and with a presumption of innocence prior to conviction, this sort of
liability is "contrary to natural justice."46
Long ago, in Boyd v. United States,47 the United States Supreme
Court may not have intended, in suggesting a comparison to the feudal system of absolute
power in the lord. The right of the government to exact civil forfeitures in an arbitrary and
high-handed fashion looks much more like the practice of feudal lords than that of a modern,
democratic government. For a more complete discussion of the tie between the action of civil
forfeiture and the exercise of sovereignty, see generally Finkelstein, supra note 35.
43. Clark, supra note 16, at 395 n.49.
44. The legislative history contains the following statements: "Clearly, if law enforcement
efforts to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they must include an
attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the mechanism through which
such an attack may be made." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-97 (1982), reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3374 (emphasis added). This sentence does
not distinguish between civil and criminal forfeiture. Indeed, it is clear from a complete
reading of the text that the word "forfeiture" in the quoted sentence is meant to encompass
both types. "It was hoped that through the use of current criminal and civil forfeiture
provisions, forfeiture would become a powerful weapon in the fight against drug trafficking and
racketeering." Id. at 194, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3377
(emphasis added).
45. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
46. Beaudry v. United States, 79 F.2d 650, 650 (5th Cir. 1935). There is no doubt that the
boundary between the civil and criminal area is blurred in many respects. See generally Note,
Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REv. 689 (1930). In part, this
blurring parallels the difficulty in distinguishing the public from the private sphere; the value
of autonomy versus the utilitarian notion of legitimate government interference for the
"common good." It is beyond the scope of this Comment to draw that line. Nevertheless, as
long as we acknowledge that there is some limit-i.e., the government cannot put to death
carriers of a dreaded disease in the name of the "common good"-forfeiture, unconnected to
any culpability for a crime, oversteps the line of legitimate government action. For an
interesting philosophical discussion on the relevance of culpability to the infliction of
punishment, see Spjut, The Relevance of Culpability to the Punishment and Prevention of
Crime, 19 AKRON L.J. 197 (1985). For an exploration of the blurring of this notion of
culpability in the tort context, see Zwier, "Cause in Fact" in Tort Law-A Philosophical and
Historical Examination, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 769 (1982).
47. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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Court held that the fourth amendment protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures applied to a civil forfeiture information brought
under the tariff laws because "[t]he information, though technically a
civil proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal one."4 It further
noted, "It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon."49 In spite of the Boyd Court's admonition, the courts have,
for the most part, long abandoned this duty with respect to civil
forfeitures.
The Alvarez case is but one of a number of examples of how the
doctrine of civil forfeiture has turned into a legal juggernaut, crushing
every due process claim thrown in its path: the privilege against self-
incrimination,5" the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
48. Id. at 634 (emphasis added). The Court cited its decision in Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436 (1886), as support for this proposition. In Coffey, the Court held that an
acquittal on a criminal charge acted as a bar to a civil forfeiture arising out of the same acts.
Id. at 442. Justice Blatchford, writing for the Court, reasoned that the judgment of acquittal in
the criminal case acted as a determination "that the facts which were the basis of that
proceeding, and are the basis of this one... did not exist... [T]he facts cannot be again
litigated ... as the basis of any statutory punishment denounced as a consequence of the
existence of the facts." Id. at 444-45. In a later tax case the Court held the reverse; the
acquittal on charges of tax fraud did not bar the imposition of a punitive, 50%, civil penalty
based on the same operative set of facts because civil and criminal actions are distinct.
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). While Helvering did not specifically overrule
Coffey, the two cases are in hopeless conflict. More recently the Court has said, "The time has
come to clarify that neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil, remedial
forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related criminal charges. To the
extent that Coffey v. United States suggests otherwise, it is hereby disapproved." United States
v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984). For a complete discussion of this
conflict and its ramifications, see Clark, supra note 46, at 381-97 (1976).
49. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. 5, cl. 3 ("No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... ). Of course, by its label, civil forfeiture is not criminal.
However, this Comment argues that forfeiture is essentially a criminal action, no matter the
label put on it. Furthermore, civil forfeitures often overlap with criminal proceedings. See,
e.g., United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz, 618 F.2d 453, 468 (7th Cir. 1980)
("[O]rdinarily forfeiture proceedings are instituted in connection with criminal prosecutions
arising out of the same transactions .... "); United States v. Real Property & Residence at
3097 S.W. 111 th Ave., 699 F. Supp. 287 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (civil forfeiture action brought after
arrest on drug trafficking charges, but before conviction) See generally Comment,
Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 390, 397 (1988). As in
Alvarez, a defendant in a criminal proceeding is often forced to choose between remaining
silent in a parallel civil forfeiture proceeding, thereby losing his property because the burden of
proof is on the claimant, or testifying and risking waiver of his right to remain silent in the
criminal trial. See United States v. Property Located at 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1990) (suggesting that adverse inference from claimant's invocation of fifth amendment
privilege, normally permissible in civil context, may not be permissible in forfeiture context).
If a defendant testifies in the civil forfeiture proceeding, he runs the risk that, for purposes of a
future criminal proceeding, the court will deem his right to remain silent waived, since both
actions are essentially based on the same set of facts. United States v. United States Currency,
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ment,51 the right to trial by jUry,5 2 the right to a verdict rendered only
after a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,53 the right to be
626 F.2d 11, 14-15 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting the government's brief to the effect that testimony
in civil forfeiture proceeding would constitute a waiver of fifth amendment privilege for
purposes of criminal prosecution). The dilemma also operates in other ways. In one case the
government gave a defendant immunity for his testimony in a criminal proceeding and then,
arguing that the immunity applied only to criminal proceedings, attempted to use his
testimony against him in a forfeiture hearing. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate,
911 F.2d 1525, 1527 (11th Cir. 1990). The appellate court remanded the case for the trial
court to determine whether a forfeiture was "quasi-criminal." Id It is interesting to note that
for purposes of waiver of the fifth amendment privilege, the facts are conceded as "essentially
the same," while they are not conceded as the "same" for double jeopardy purposes. See Boyd,
116 U.S. at 616, and cases cited infra note 54.
51. U.S. CONsT. amend. 8 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments infficted."). Because the government does not
technically acknowledge civil forfeiture as a "punishment" it is unclear whether an eighth
amendment challenge could ever be raised; it is difficult to argue that punishment is excessive if
the government refuses to acknowledge in the first instance that it is punishing you.
Nevertheless, in one case a claimant argued that forfeiture of her Porsche was
"unconscionable" when the vehicle, offered as collateral for her brother's appearance bond,
was found to contain only .226 grams of marijuana. United States v. One 1976 Porsche 91 IS,
670 F.2d 810, 812 (1979). The court rejected claimant's argument because "[t]he courts have
uniformly held that a vehicle is subject to forfeiture no matter how small the quantity of
contraband found." Id (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also. United States v. One
1985 Mercedes, 917 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1990) ($45,000 car forfeited for possession of $75 worth
of cocaine); United States v. One Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting eighth
amendment challenge as inapplicable in civil forfeiture context). The eighth amendment
challenge has also been rejected in the criminal forfeiture context. See, eg., United States v.
Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987). Given the apparent proportionality requirement in
the words "excessive fine," one could argue that forfeiture represented an excessive fine if it is
not proportionate to the violation that justifies the forfeiture. The nature of the arguments in
support of civil forfeiture indicates that the courts' response would be that a forfeiture is not a
"fine.,,
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 1 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ); id. amend. VII, cl. 1
("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... "). The right to trial by jury is implicated both in
civil forfeitures and third-party claims pursuant to criminal forfeitures. In neither case is trial
by jury usually permitted. See 18 U.S.C. 1963(1)(2) (1988); 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(2) (1988).
Although section 881 of the civil forfeiture statute does not explicitly call for a bench trial,
generally jury trials are not given. The explanation for this is that forfeitures under admiralty
were conducted without a jury. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. However, at least
one court has held that a jury is constitutionally mandated in a civil forfeiture, and that there is
historical support for this position. See, United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz, 618 F.2d
453, 456-69 (7th Cir. 1980).
53. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In civil forfeiture the court may render a verdict
against a claimant on the basis of mere probable cause because "[o]nce the government
demonstrates that probable cause exists, the burden of proof in a civil forfeiture proceeding
shifts to the claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not
subject to forfeiture." United States v. One Single Family Residence ("Heidi"), 803 F.2d 625,
629 (lth Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Four Million Two Hundred and Fifty-five
Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Parcel of Land and
Residence, 914 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990) (government's evidence amounted to "mere suspicion"
failing to meet probable cause standard). See generally Strafer, Civil Forfeitures Protecting the
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free from being twice charged with the same offense,54 the right to be
free from government seizures of property absent probable cause,5"
and the right to counsel of choice.5 6 All of the claims to these rights
I
Innocent Owner, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 841 (1985); Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the
Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceedings Arising Out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DuKE
L.J. 822.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. 5, cl. 2 ("No person ... shall... be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ). In spite of the words "life or limb," the
double jeopardy clause is seen as applying to all criminal prosecutions, hence the invocation of
the civil/criminal distinction. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232
(1972) (civil forfeiture not barred by acquittal on criminal charges arising out of same set of
facts); United States v. Dunn, 802 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987)
(civil forfeiture of money which was held not forfeitable by jury in criminal proceeding does
not violate double jeopardy); But see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
1 55. U.S. CONST. amend. 4 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .. "). Section 881(b)(4) allows the Attorney
General to seize property without a warrant if he "has probable cause to believe that the
property is subject to civil forfeiture ...... This language is so broad that it seemingly
swallows up the other more specific provisions in the statute because, even though the statute
presumably requires probable cause, it does not require any showing of probable cause until
after the seizure. This provides the government with the opportunity to attempt to justify a
seizure on the basis of information received as a result of the seizure itself, rather than by any
pre-seizure information which would constitute probable cause. In fact, such after-the-fact
justifications are attempted even where there is a warrant. See, eg., United States v.
$38,000.00, 816 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ladson, 774 F.2d 436 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Certain Real Property, 612 F. Supp. 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1985); United
States v. One 1981 Cadillac Eldorado, 535 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Iln. 1982). But see Vance v.
United States, 676 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1982) (forfeiture denied where based on evidence
obtained through illegal search); United States v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. Single Premium Whole
Life Policy, 647 F. Supp. 732 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (warrants based on "information and belief,"
issued by clerk ex parte, are unconstitutional with respect to seizures under section 881);
Application of Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219, 223 (D. Mass. 1985) (warrants issued under
Admiralty Rule C must also meet "probable cause" standard in order not to violate fourth
amendment). Furthermore, some courts have ruled that claimants generally, or lienholder
claimants in particular, have no standing to challenge warrantless searches as due process
violations. See, e.g., United States v. One 1985 BMW 318i, 696 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Iln. 1988).
For commentary on this problem, see Winn, Seizure of Private Property in the War Against
Drugs: What Process Is Due?, 41 Sw. L.J. 1111 (1988); Note, Forfeiture Seizures and the
Warrant Requirement, 48 U. CHi. L. REv. 960 (1981).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. 6, cl. 3 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."). The right to counsel of choice is
currently the source of much debate in the criminal rather than the civil forfeiture context. See
United States v. One Single Family Home ("Alvarez"), 683 F. Supp. 783, 789 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
However, the expansion of the civil forfeiture doctrine of relation-back causes the problem in
the criminal context, at least as the law is currently interpreted. See infra notes 283-312 and
accompanying text. One wonders whether Congress could pass a statute calling for the
forfeiture of essentially all of a person's assets and achieve the same result, and whether this is
in fact what it has done with the "substitute proceeds" portions of section 1963 and section
853. If so, this implicates the prohibitions on Bills of Attainder and "corruption of the blood
or forfeiture" contained in the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.,
as the substitute proceeds provisions appear to call for a result that is indistinguishable from
these prohibitions.
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have been rejected, and their existence limited, or eliminated entirely,
in the realm of civil forfeiture." In addition, because civil forfeiture
concepts have been borrowed in the drafting and interpretation of the
criminal forfeiture laws,5" these deprivations are being carried over
into the criminal forfeiture setting as well. 9
Because the entire civil forfeiture doctrine is made up of legal
fictions that if applied in a logically consistent manner provide no
internal check on the government's power to employ forfeiture, its
application is virtually unbounded. In effect, the operation of the civil
forfeiture statutes allows the government to "bypass entirely the cum-
bersome criminal justice system, with its tedious set of impediments
to investigation, prosecution, and conviction, and substitute a control
system consisting of civil sanctions."'  Arguably, this "bypass" is
precisely the result that Congress intended when it enacted the forfei-
ture statutes, both civil and criminal, particularly the 1984
amendments.6'
57. See supra notes 50-56.
58. See infra notes 266-312 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 266-312 and accompanying text.
60. Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 889, 925 (1987). The author was actually posing a rhetorical question by
prefacing the quoted statement with "why not." What he framed as a rhetorical question is
the reality with respect to civil forfeitures. Note that in the Alvarez case the government never
secured a conviction because the defendant fled. In some cases the government has declined to
pursue a criminal action and satisfied itself with the civil proceeding. See, e.g., LaChance v.
Drug Enforcement Admin., 672 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (no criminal charges fied). In
another case, the government had sought criminal forfeiture of two separate sums of money.
The jury returned a verdict finding only the lesser sum forfeit, whereupon the government
instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against the greater sum. The civil forfeiture was granted
and upheld and found not to violate due process or double jeopardy. United States v. Dunn
802 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987); see also United States v. One
Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8 (lst Cir. 1977) (civil forfeiture not barred by collateral
estoppel where government voluntarily dismissed charges of illegal possession of a controlled
substance but subsequently instituted civil forfeiture proceedings).
61. That Congress intended to make forfeitures easier to obtain is demonstrated by the
following passage. "This bill [the 1984 amendments] is intended to eliminate the statutory
limitations and ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law
enforcement agencies." S. REP. No. 225 supra note 44, at 192, reprinted in 1984 CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3375. Some of the "ambiguities" and "limitations" referred to are the
former requirements of pre-seizure notice and hearing, the former absence in the civil
forfeiture statute of direct authority to forfeit real property, the difficulty of preventing
fraudulent transfer of assets to third parties by criminal defendants, and the absence of a
"funding mechanism" to defray the cost of pursuing forfeitures. Id. at 192-93, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3375-76.
An interesting aside is that one of the purported purposes of the amendments was to allow
the government to use "criminal forfeiture as an alternative to civil forfeiture in all drug felony
cases." Id. at 193 (emphasis added), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182,
3376. This statement presumes civil forfeiture is linked to criminal law enforcement. This
aspect was supposed to be a boon to prosecutors. However, it did not take prosecutors long to
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The 1984 amendments62 included: additions to, and broadening
of, the categories of forfeitable property;63 a provision whereby local
law enforcement agencies could retain some of the proceeds of forfeit-
ures;M and a codification of the relation-back and presumption of for-
feitability doctrines, taken from civil forfeiture, into the criminal
statutes.6" These amendments have had the desired effect of vastly
accelerating the use of forfeiture proceedings.66 This, in turn, means
figure out, if indeed they ever were in doubt, that "in certain respects, civil forfeiture has
advantages over criminal forfeiture." IM. at 196, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3379. The report notes these advantages as being an early right to
seizure and a lower burden of proof. Id As a result, and as the Alvarez case demonstrates, the
government has in fact instituted civil forfeitures parallel with, prior to or in lieu of criminal
prosecutions.
62. See CFA, supra note 9, at §§ 301, 323.
63. Id. § 306 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988)). Prior to the 1984 amendments,
the government could not seek the forfeiture of real property for drug violations under section
881 because it did not include real property in its list of forfeitable property. In spite of the
already broad reach of civil forfeiture, Congress added real property to the list of forfeitable
property in order to improve its effectiveness as a deterrent to drug-trafficking and to remove
procedural restrictions that were perceived to be hindering the government's use of civil
forfeiture as a weapon against drug trafficking. The real property amendment was apparently
a key concern:
The extent of... civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 is also too limited in one
respect. Under current law, if a person uses a boat or car to transport narcotics
... his use of the property renders it subject to civil forfeiture. But if he uses a
secluded barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his house as a manufacturing
laboratory for amphetamines, there is no provision to subject his real property to
civil forfeiture ....
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 44, at 195, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3378. A footnote indicates that real property was forfeitable under section 881(a)(6) if it
constituted proceeds of, or was traceable to, an illegal drug transaction. Id. at n. 19. It is clear
why this provision may have been difficult to implement, because even the most adept of gov-
ernment prosecutors might find it difficult to prove that a house had been purchased with the
proceeds of an illegal transaction without first proving that a person had been guilty of con-
ducting such a transaction.
64. CFA, supra note 9, §§ 309-310 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(e), (0) (1988)). Allowing
local law enforcement agencies to share in the proceeds of forfeiture calls into question their
impartiality in seeking it. For a discussion of this problem, see infra notes 234, 323-29 and
accompanying text.
65. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988) (the relation-back provision). "[This approach,
known as the 'taint theory' is one that 'has long been recognized in forfeiture cases.'" Caplin
& Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2653 (1989) (citing legislative history)
Note that the Court does not say civil forfeiture cases. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21
U.S.C. § 853(e) (1988) with 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
66. Seizures of drug cash and property by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
have soared to record levels in Miami, reaching $210 million in 1989. That surpasses Los
Angeles's $159 million and New York's $95 million. Dirty Dollars: Laundering Drug Cash,
Miami Herald, Feb. 11, 1990, at IA, col. 2, 25A, col. 1. See also Wisotsky, supra note 60, at
894 (new records have been set in "every category of measurement---drug seizures,
investigations, indictments, arrests, convictions, and asset forfeitures") (citing ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG
ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE PROGRAM 102-03 (1984)).
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that the constitutional infirmities of the doctrine are regularly
ignored--each such decision representing an example of the "stealthy
encroachment" feared by the Boyd Court.
As the popularity of forfeiture as a law enforcement tool has
grown, so has the concern over many of its constitutional infirmities.67
The more often these concerns are ignored, or glossed over, the
greater the danger that we will become inured to violations of civil
rights, and the closer we will move toward a police state. A police
state is surely not what the framers of the Constitution envisioned.6"
Nevertheless, since the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing,69 which held that forfeiture of an
innocent lessor's interest in a yacht, due to the presence of two mari-
juana cigarettes, did not violate due process, most of the recent consti-
tutional challenges to the statutes have failed.70
The civil forfeiture doctrine must be challenged.71 Its current
67. See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 35; Strafer, supra note 53; Winick, supra note 18;
Winn, supra note 55; Wisotsky, supra note 60; Comment, supra note 50; Note, supra note 53.
The importation of the concepts embodied in civil forfeiture to the criminal forfeiture penalty,
see infra notes 266-84, brings these concerns into stark relief because, in the criminal setting,
any pretense that forfeiture is remedial or regulatory must be cast aside.
68. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 265. Not only do the discussions
surrounding the drafting and adoption of the Constitution reflect a concern for the separation
and dissemination of power, but the Constitution itself, by its own terms, reflects a deep
distrust of the consolidation of power in its various provisions setting up a separation of
powers and protections for individual rights against government over-reaching. See B.
BELKNAP, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55-93 (1967).
69. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). In deference to Justice Brennan, a great defender of civil rights, it
is perhaps unfair to lay the blame on Calero-Toledo. However, since Calero-Toldeo, most of
the important forfeiture case decisions have concerned the criminal forfeiture statutes. See,
e.g., Caplan & Drysdale Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). To some extent,
the validity of these cases depends on the validity of civil forfeiture established in Calero-
Toledo. See infra note 70.
70. See Clark, supra note 16, at 390-91. Clark too apparently gives up hope of unseating
doctrines that "fl[y] in the face of venerable and apparently unshakable precedent." Id. In a
footnote to this statement he cites the example of civil forfeitures and the Calero-Toledo
decision. Id at 391 n.39; see also, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663 (1974) (civil forfeiture of innocent lessor's yacht not a "taking" for purposes of fifth
amendment); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (civil
forfeiture instituted after acquittal on criminal charges based on same set of facts does not
violate double jeopardy clause); United States v. One 1985 Mercedes, 917 F.2d 415, 420 (9th
Cir. 1990) (due process requirements lower in civil forfeiture than in "traditional civil cases");
United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 7715 Betsy Bruce Lane, 906 F.2d 110, 111 (4th
Cir. 1990) (conviction of underlying criminal activity not a prerequisite to forfeiture; hearsay
evidence admissable); United States v. A Single Family Residence ("Heidi"), 803 F.2d 625
(11th Cir. 1986) (civil forfeiture statute not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate due
process); United States v. One 1976 Porsche 91 IS, 670 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1979) (civil forfeiture
of Porsche automobile for .226 grams of marijuana not "unconscionable" and does not violate
constitutional ban on "cruel and unusual punishment").
71. The civil forfeiture doctrine has not gone unchallenged by legal scholars. In fact, the
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operation represents an illegitimate exercise of governmental power.
In order to challenge the doctrine, however, one must examine both
the tangled historical roots and the modem justifications for the per-
sonification fiction which is at its heart because the personification
fiction provides the screen behind which the constitutional problems
are hidden or denied. The tangles are daunting. Explanations for the
personification fiction in the forfeiture context, and the resultant cate-
gorization of forfeiture as a civil action, are many. There are no clear
lines demarcating one theory from another and reasons often overlap.
However, as one commentator put it,
[O]ne cannot hope to have such doctrines abandoned or their ineq-
uities remedied until the demon is tracked through history to its
original contextual "lair" where it may finally be confronted, iden-
tified by its original name, and only then, effectively exorcised. All
else is not much more than tinkering with the machinery or treat-
ing the symptoms.
72
Accordingly, Section II of this Comment "tracks the demon" by
exploring the historical justifications for the personification fiction.
Section III examines the "tinkering with the machinery" in which
modem courts have engaged in order to justify civil forfeiture's con-
tinued vitality and argues that these modem rationales are unconvinc-
ing. Section IV explores the impact of the civil forfeiture doctrine in
the criminal setting. Finally, Section V argues that Congress, in its
frenzy to attack the drug problem by enacting draconian civil forfei-
ture laws, is only "treating the symptoms" of the disease, while imper-
missibly infringing upon precious civil liberties in the process. To the
extent that important civil rights are brushed aside in the name of
expediency and efficiency, the treatment may very well kill the
patient. It is the responsibility of the courts to see that it does not.
II. "TRACKING THE DEMON"
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v.
United States Coin & Currency,73 wrote, "Traditionally, forfeiture
actions have proceeded upon the fiction that inanimate objects them-
selves can be guilty of wrongdoing. Simply put, the theory has been
that if the object is 'guilty,' it should be held forfeit."' 74 The Court
found that this "traditional notion" had its roots in the old English
two most compelling assaults were made, far more thoroughly than in this Comment, long
before the doctrine expanded as it has. See Finkelstein, supra note 35, and Note, supra note 24.
72. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 258.
73. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
74. Id at 719 (citations omitted).
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common law action of deodand." Thus, the first task is to examine
deodand to determine whether it has any remaining vitality as a justi-
fication for the personification fiction of modem civil forfeiture.76
A. Deodand
The word "deodand" derives from the Latin Deo dandum mean-
ing "given to God."'77 At English common law, deodand was a form
of action by the Crown to assess and recover the value of an object,
movable or immovable,78 that was "the direct agent[ ] of a man's
death. '79  "The deodand objects [were] not themselves confiscated,
but their value assessed, the proceeds then being due to the Crown as
75. "The modem forfeiture statutes are the direct descendants of this [deodand] heritage."
Id. at 720. The Court supported this assertion by pointing to Holmes's The Common Law:
"'Where a man killeth another with the sword of John at Stile, the sword shall be forfeit as
deodand, and yet no default is in the owner.'" Id. at 720-21 n.3 (quoting O.W. HOLMES,
supra note 41, at 23); see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680. Numerous other courts have
followed the Supreme Court's lead in describing deodand as a precursor to civil forfeiture. See,
e.g., United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3rd Cir. 1987) (citing deodand as precedent
for in rem forfeiture); United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (noting that in rem proceeding appears to have its "roots in the concept of the
deodand"). But see King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1966) (declining to
accept the government's theory that the rifle used to kill President Kennedy is forfeit to the
government "as a species of Deodands"). The Court's reliance on the Holmes quotation is a
curious choice because its meaning is somewhat obscure. It originates from St. German's,
Doctor & Student dialogues published in 1530. C. ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR & STUDENT 291 (91
Selden Soc'y 1974). One author has suggested that "reliance upon deodand as a general
forfeiture principle of early English law is probably misplaced," because the St. German
quotation is the sole source of support for that premise, and "a careful reading of the sentence
in context does not support that conclusion." Note, supra note 24, at 772 & n.31.
76. This Comment proposes that a law must have some justification rooted in current as
well as historical notions of justice and fair play. The United States Supreme Court does not
seem to be working from this premise in the civil forfeiture context. In J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921), the Court wrote, "But whether the
reason for [forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of this country to be now displaced." In Calero-Toledo the Supreme Court cited
this language with approval and, with its long historical section, seemed to reason from the
same premise. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 685-86. Reliance on tradition has proven a useful
means for lower courts to avoid complicated analysis of civil forfeiture's troubling implications
for due process. See, e.g., United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft,
671 F.2d 414, 417-18 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Calero-Toledo Court's historical discussion);
United States v. One Chevrolet Truck, 79 F.2d 651, 652 (5th Cir. 1935) (citing Goldsmith-
Grant for proposition that forfeiture is not barred by owner's lack of notice of property's illegal
use); Beaudry v. United States, 79 F.2d 650, 650 (5th Cir. 1935) (citing Goldsmith-Grant for
proposition that guilt or innocence of owner is irrelevant to forfeiture determination).
77. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 180 n.35.
78. This distinction is important because of later theories concerning the justification for
deodand and its posture as an action in rem. See infra notes 114-16, 192-200 and
accompanying text.
79. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 185.
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a forfeiture."' 0 In spite of the fact that the proceeds from the action
went to the Crown, not to the decedent's survivors, deodand was not,
strictly speaking, a criminal action. Rather, it applied only in cases of
death by misadventure or negligence, what would today be called
wrongful death, an action sounding in tort.
The original justification upon which the Crown based the right
of action in deodand is not known for certain, although there are
many theories. All of the existing theories appear to be retrospective
attempts to explain a form of action for which the justification was
forgotten long before the action itself was abandoned."1 One theory is
that forfeiture of the offending object or its price was a "religious expi-
ation. '8 2 The deodand object had been "tainted" by association with
an act (an accident) that resulted in someone's death and the forfei-
ture represented a ritual "cleansing."83 Another explanation offered
is that forfeiture was a substitute for revenge by the decedent's rela-
tives against the owner of the offending object." In this view, the
purpose of surrendering the offending object was to avoid private jus-
tice.85 A third theory advanced is that the personification of the
80. Id
81. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to investigate the origins of the concept of
deodand, as the most accessible authorities do not agree, or simply admit that the exact
theories of the action are unknown.
82. "The origins of deodand are traceable to Biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices,
which reflected the view that the instrument of death was accused and that religious expiation
was required." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974). For
this proposition the Court cited EXODUS 21:28: "If an ox gore a man or a woman, and they
die, he shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten ...." Id. at n.17. But see generally
Finkelstein, supra note 35 (arguing that Judeo-Christian tradition does not support this
theory.)
83. "The concept of in rem forfeiture is based on the idea that the property itself can be
tainted with guilt when involved in a criminal act." Comment, supra note 50, at 391 (citing D.
SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES 2.02 (1986)) (emphasis added).
Whatever the original justification, this treatment survives in the form of the relation-back
fiction in both the criminal and civil forfeiture statutes. The relation-back provisions imply
that forfeiture to the government is a form of expiation, that the object is "cleansed" of its
unwholesome associations by being ritually sacrificed to the State. In this respect it appears
that the State is assuming the role in society formerly played by the Church. See infra notes
94-101 and accompanying text.
84. Avoidance of private vengeance was apparently also the purpose of the Anglo-Saxon
doctrine of noxal surrender, which may be the ancestor of deodand. The offending object was
surrendered to the victim's relatives, "not as a true restitution for the damage done, but as a
ransom to forestall further action by the injured party." Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 181
(citing from the LAWS OF ALFRED THE GREAT, ch. 13). Finkelstein notes however that "[w]e
have little direct evidence of Anglo-Saxon practice that can with any confidence be thought to
be uncontaminated by the biblical tradition and its moral categories." Id. This statement
suggests that the theories that attempt to explain the deodand practice may be intertwined,
with no one theory providing a complete explanation.
85. One of the problems with the "substitute revenge" theory is that human agency is not
necessary in the deodand theory. Thus, if a man falls off of his own cart and is trampled to
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offending object in a deodand action was simply an outgrowth of a
natural, primal impulse such as "leads even civilized man to kick a
door when it pinches his finger."" 6 As plausible as these explanations
are, none of them seem relevant today as a rationale for drug-related
forfeitures. Furthermore, it is not an essential element of these theo-
ries that the government, in the form of the Crown, be the beneficiary
of the action. Arguably, any of these goals could have been just as
easily achieved had the right of action rested with the injured party.
However, Blackstone offered a fourth theory of the rationale for
deodand.
Although Blackstone too assumed that deodand had a religious
purpose-to pay for masses to be said for the souls of the victim8 -he
offered a more pragmatic explanation. He wrote that deodands were
"grounded [on the] additional reason[] that such misfortunes [wrong-
ful deaths] are in part owing to the negligence of the owner [of the
thing forfeited], and therefore he is properly punished by such forfei-
ture."' 8 Blackstone's explanation suggests that the purpose of deo-
dand was the punishment and deterrence of negligence. Given that
the elimination of the deodand action in England coincided with the
death by his own horses, all might be forfeit as deodand, even though the property belongs to
the victim, and presumably would otherwise go to his family. See Finkelstein, supra note 35,
at 182. In this scenario there is no "revenge" by the family that forfeiture to the government
would forestall.
86. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 41, at 11. The attempt by the government to forfeit the gun
which was used to assassinate President Kennedy may demonstrate that this "natural
impulse" theory retains some validity. United States v. One 6.5 mm. Mannlicher-Carcano
Military Rifle, 250 F. Supp. 410 (D.C.N.D. Tex.), rev'd sub nom King v. United States, 364
F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966). However, given the peculiar circumstances in which this case arose,
it may demonstrate the government's willingness to use the most convenient tool available in
the exercise of its authority to retain material evidence of a crime rather than any real concern
about revenge. Ultimately the government retained the rifle on grounds other than forfeiture.
87. "[Deodand] seems to have been originally designed, in the blind days of popery, as an
expiation for the souls of such as were snatched away by sudden death; and for that purpose
ought properly to have been given to [the] holy church ...."1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
39, at *300. Note that this statement does not explain the necessity of the personification
theory. It only supplies an explanation for the existence of an action to pay for masses. A
number of other devices calculated to achieve this purpose can be imagined.
If Blackstone was initially correct in assigning to the deodand a religious purpose, then
presumably the Crown was supposed to use the proceeds from deodands to pay for masses for
the soul of the deceased-not to keep those proceeds for itself. There is little evidence that the
Crown engaged in such a pious practice, or if it did, that it continued for long. Finkelstein,
supra note 35, at 182.
88. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at "301 (emphasis added). Deterrence of negligence
might be the most persuasive argument for the deodand if only it were clear that negligence
was a necessary component for the imposition of the fine. See supra note 85. One could argue,
however, that it may have represented an evidentiary presumption of negligence. For an
argument that the in rem posture of modern civil forfeiture actions represents an evidentiary
presumption, see infra text following note 200.
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creation of a private cause of action for wrongful death, 9 it would
seem that Blackstone was correct. 90 However, this theory does not
explain why the personification of the offending object was seen as
necessary in the first place.
Furthermore, Blackstone's theory is inconsistent with the law's
operation. If the object of deodand (and civil forfeiture) is to deter
negligence, or to punish negligent owners, why then did the action
operate though "no default [lay] in the owner?" 91 Personification of
an offending object shifts the inquiry away from any the negligence of
the owner, and, thus, from the propriety of punishing him.
[T]he doctrine that the sovereign is authorized to impose forfeit-
ures and confiscations on 'guilty things' without regard to the
interests of the innocent owners of those things, is about as irra-
tional and unjust a proposition as a sober mind can concoct, for all
that it has a history of thousands of years behind it .... 92
Thus, still unanswered are the following questions: What function
did the personification fiction perform, and what is there about deo-
dand that bears any relationship to civil forfeiture which would justify
reliance on it? Unfortunately, these questions appear to be
unanswerable.
In 1845, in discussing the abolition of deodand, Lord Campbell
remarked that it was a "wonder that a law so extremely absurd and
inconvenient should have remained in force... especially... [as it]
was called into action almost weekly. ' 93 Lord Campell's surprise not-
withstanding, there is an explanation for the persistence of deodand,
one that might also explain the tenacity of its grip on the modern
judiciary. That explanation has its roots in the philosophy of legal
positivism. As one commentator put it, "[T]he real rationale for the
deodand institution lay in the assumption by the state-in England,
i.e., the Crown-of the role of the vicar of transcendent concerns and
89. The act abolishing deodand was passed at the same time as the "Act for Compensating
Families of Persons Killed by Accidents," commonly known as "Lord Campbell's Act." See
Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 170-73 & nn.l-16. Both acts were passed in 1846. Id. at 170-71.
90. Indeed, the deterrence of negligence argument has been invoked as a justification for
modem civil forfeiture. See infra notes 247-65 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 75.
92. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 257.
93. 77 HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 1027 (1845). In contrast to Lord
Campbell, the modern courts that have cited deodand as the source of the personification
fiction in civil forfeiture generally have done so without any similar expression of wonder. See,
e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681-86 (1974); In re Various
Items of Personal Property, 282 U.S. 577, 580 (1931); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921); Dobbins Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401-02
(1878). But see United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720 (1971)
(finding it "remarkable" that it is the money that is charged with "the actionable wrong").
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values, superseding the Church in most of its authority in these
domains.
' 94
In the sixteenth century, Henry VIII, King of England, desig-
nated himself the Head of the Church in place of the Pope because the
Pope would not grant him the divorce he wanted. 9 The Reformation
in England saw the beginning of an important shift in the role of the
state,96 and arguably facilitated the later adoption of a philosophy
that saw its culmination in "the utilitarian view of morals, law and
sovereignty as expounded by Bentham and Austin," and the philoso-
phy of the State advanced by Hegel.97 These views signaled a shift
away from crimes concerning individual morals, and toward those
considered an offense to the general well-being. The State, in this
view, had the responsibility for the general well-being-both moral
and physical. Hence, as the secular and spiritual merged and over-
lapped, the State became ascendent and the Church was, for all prac-
tical purposes, stripped of any real power or authority. Over time,
religious crimes punishable by the ecclesiastical courts vanished, and
all these matters became concerns of the State.98
This concept may have had its impact on all forfeiture laws,
including deodand. Blackstone anticipated this theory in the follow-
ing explanation for forfeitures:
The true reason and only substantial ground of any forfeiture for
crimes consists in this; that all property is derived from society,
being one of those civil rights which are conferred upon individu-
94. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 183.
95. Henry VIII wanted to divorce his wife, Katherine of Aragon, daughter of Ferdinand
and Isabella of Spain, in order to marry Anne Boylen. His hope was that Anne Boylen would
given him the legitimate male heir he had not produced in his marriage with Katherine. See
generally M. BRUCE, ANNE BOYLEN (1972); J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII (1968).
96. Henry VIII took advantage of this new position as Head of the Church to confiscate
much of its revenues. See generally G. ELTON, REFORM AND REFORMATION, 1509-1660
(1971). He also abolished many Catholic practices that formerly resulted in income to the
Church and redirected those revenues to the Crown. Id. Deodand seems to fit well into this
shift in authority. Henry's assumption of this role, and his subsequent appropriation of the
revenues of the Church, took place at the point of the sword. J. RIDLEY, STATESMAN AND
SAINT 263-84 (1982). Although the emerging Protestant middle class may have applauded
some of the reforms of the Church undertaken during the Reformation, id. at 216-17, 281, the
break with the Pope was not universally popular, and many people were executed for their
refusal to sign the Act of Succession and the Act of Supremacy. Id. at 277. As one might
expect, the logic of appropriating the benefits of the Church as a result of claiming the title of
Head of the Church was suggested to Henry by a lawyer, Thomas Cromwell. M. BRUCE,
supra note 95, at 169-171, 288.
97. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 201.
98. See id. at 198-212. In particular, see id. at 208 n.113 ("The state does not exist for the
citizens; on the contrary.., the state is the end and they are its means .... All the value man
has, all spiritual reality, he has only through the state.") (quoting G. HEGEL, REASON IN
HISTORY 52-53 (R. Hartman trans. (1953)).
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als, in exchange for that degree of natural freedom, which every
man must sacrifice when he enters into social communities. If,
therefore, a member of any national community violates the funda-
mental contract of his association, by transgressing the municipal
law, he forfeits his right to such privileges as he claims by that
contract; and the state may very justly resume that portion of
property, or any part of it, which the laws have before assigned
him.9 9
Although Blackstone's comment pre-dates Hegel, it reflects his
philosophy of legal positivism. Hegel saw the laws enacted by the
State as prompted by the State's right to secure the general well-being.
In other words, granting the ideal that the sovereign authority cor-
porately represents the expression of the greatest number .... the
laws enacted by that society always reflect general expediency, and
hence are always "right." In short,. . . there [is]... no distinction
in kind between a violation of a public revenue law and a law pro-
tecting the public health."°°
99. 1 w. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *299 (emphasis added). Blackstone was
referring, in the passage in text, to forfeiture for "infamous crimes." Nevertheless, he ended
this paragraph by introducing the theory of deodand without explaining why a similar
"punishment" applied, even though there was no "infamous crime" with deodand since the
claim was only the modem equivalent of negligence. Perhaps the same rationale applied-that
of an "offense" to the King. In actuality, however, the deodand may have persisted because
the Crown was loath to give up a source of revenue. The loss of revenue should the action be
abolished became a sticking point in the debate over the proposal to eliminate the deodand.
Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 204 n. 105. It is no accident that Blackstone's section on
deodands comes under the heading of "The King's Revenues." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
39, at *300. "It was estimated that the privy purse was receiving, in 1846, some £700-800 per
year, arising from deodand." Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 173 n.16 (citation omitted).
Finkelstein argues, however, that the reluctance to do away with deodand had more to do
with the "transcendence" of human life, which made it obnoxious to put a price on it. Iti at
173-83 (citing Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808)). Because the Crown, as
sovereign, had assumed the role of "vicar of transcendent concerns," resting the action in the
Crown may have been seen as more appropriate than leaving it to individuals to degrade
human life by quarreling over its price. Id at 183.
It is also interesting to note that Blackstone equates "the state" with "society." He seems
to be describing a more egalitarian and participatory form of the State than was represented by
the English monarchy of his time. For a description of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES as an
apologist attempting to reconcile contradictions in existing laws and power arrangements,
thereby legitimizing them, see Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFFALO L. REv. 209, 211, 217-19 (1979).
100. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 201-02. In the quoted passage, Finkelstein was exploring
the philosophy of Bentham and the decision by Pollock, C.B., in Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M &
W 403 (Exch. 1846) (holding that forfeiture of tobacco found adulterated in violation of the
excise statutes was valid even though the owner had no knowledge or part in the adulteration;
the aim of the excise statutes was solely and explicitly the protection of the Crown's revenues
and thus did not require scienter because the law was made for "working some public good").
Another commentator has called this "the law is always right" argument; the "positivist idea
that laws are valid simply because they have been enacted." Wisotsky, supra note 60, at 906.
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What this means in practical terms is that there is no difference in
kind between a crime which causes some specific harm to identifiable,
individual citizens, and one which causes a more vague, diffuse injury
to the public as a whole, on the theory that the violation in question
either undermines the general moral fiber of society, or that it under-
mines the authority of the State.10 1 What it also means is that the
laws enacted by the State do not depend for their legitimacy upon any
rational explanation of purpose. Thus, the answers to the questions
posed above-why use the personification fiction, and why allow the
right of action in deodand to rest in the Crown---can be stated sim-
ply-because it is the law. That is what deodand has in common with
civil forfeiture.
Although a positivist view of the law seems to dictate that the
imposition of a punishment on an innocent person is justified in the
name of the greater good, this view is not that adopted by the framers
of the United States Constitution. The framers seem to have been at
least as influenced by theories of natural law as by those of positiv-
ism. 102 As written, the Constitution reflects a suspicion of an all-pow-
erful, self-justifying government.10 3 "The structure of the government
[established by the Constitution] dispersed power in reflection of the
people's distrust of concentrated power, and of power itself at all
levels." 1" The government was made for the people, not the other
way around. A legal theory with its roots in the divine right of kings
is ill-suited to the form of government reflected in this document.
Nothing in the history of deodand appears to justify the continuation
of a tradition that Lord Campbell referred to as "absurd" over one
hundred and fifty years ago. 0 5 However, deodand is not the only his-
torical basis for an action in rem. In the last passage quoted from
Blackstone, he was referring to the justification for forfeitures gener-
ally,1" not just deodand. At that time, forfeitures included both com-
101. Sometimes there is a distinction made between harms against individuals citizens and
those against society as a whole. Whenever the State reserves its most severe punishments for
crimes like treason, but punishes personal crimes, like assault for example, comparatively
mildly, the State views crimes against itself more seriously than those against a person.
102. See B. BELKNAP, supra note 68, at 22-54. Arguably, the inherent tensions in the
Constitution, as well as its ambiguities, are partially a result of the blending of natural law and
positivist philosophies.
103. See B. BELKNAP, supra note 68.
104. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964). In this seminal opinion on
the first amendment, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, quotes James Madison as stating,
"The people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty." Id. (citation omitted).
105. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 99. In fact, Blackstone was also referring to "forfeitures for crimes."
Deodand did not really fall into that category, but Blackstone nevertheless included it,
hypothesizing that it might be a form of punishment for negligence. For further discussion of
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mon law and statutory forfeitures,1"7 most of which were in
personam. Thus, unlike today's civil forfeiture proceedings, in most
early, English forfeiture proceedings, the guilt or innocence of the
defendant was highly relevant to the imposition of the penalty-that
is, outside of deodand and one other area.10 The other exception is
found in admiralty law.
B. Admiralty
The earliest American cases justifying a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing in rem involved actions for the forfeiture of ships brought under
the admiralty procedures.° 9 The in rem posture of the admiralty for-
feiture proceeding is another inheritance from English law. Early
admiralty laws in this country were patterned after the English Navi-
gation Acts of the mid-seventeenth century,110 and during this period
in England, the admiralty courts did not have jurisdiction over per-
sons."1 I Thus, those Acts constructed the forfeiture action as one in
the theory of civil forfeiture as a means to discourage negligent entrustment of property, see
infra notes 247-65 and accompanying text.
107. Common law and statutory forfeitures were, for the most part, rejected by the framers.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 & art. III, § 3 (prohibition on Bills of Attainder and
"corruption of the blood"). But see Note, supra note 24, at 779 n.73, 785-88 nn. 101-115
(illustrating criminal forfeitures that were imposed in the colonies and the Confiscation Acts of
the Civil War).
108. According to Blackstone, deodand actions, unlike modern civil forfeitures, were tried
by a jury of "twelve men," and that "juries have of late very frequently taken upon themselves
to mitigate these forfeitures, by finding only some trifling thing, or part of an entire thing, to
have been the occasion of death." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *302. Note too that, in
spite of reliance on deodand as a precursor to modern civil forfeiture, the jury component of
deodand was not borrowed. See supra note 52. Apparently only select history can justify
modern civil forfeiture practices.
109. One of the first recorded cases was United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 297
(1796) (holding that a jury in civil forfeiture was not required because forfeiture was properly
under admiralty jurisdiction, which did not traditionally provide for jury trials). A later
cluster of cases involve claims arising during the War of 1812. See, eg., The Friendschaft, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 105 (1819) (holding that the claimant/owner who resided in a neutral country
was not exempted from forfeiture where the company that owned the ship was based in
England); The Langdon Cheves, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 103 (1819) (holding that the burden of
proof in an in rem proceeding is on the claimant); The Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 101
(1819) (holding that any person may seize any property forfeit to government for purpose of
enforcing forfeiture; grounded on right of government to seize enemies' property during war).
Two other famous, early cases, United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210
(1844) (holding that innocence of owners is no defense to forfeiture in rem), and The Palmyra,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (holding that in rem forfeitures do not require criminal
conviction on facts which constitute grounds for forfeiture) involved violations of piracy laws.
Finally, there are the cases that arose during the Civil War for violations of the blockade of the
Southern ports, the most famous of which are The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863)
(holding forfeitures valid as an exercise of the war powers).
110. See Note, supra note 24, at 780.
111. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 272 (5th ed. 1977). The fact that
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At first blush, one might think that the rule in admiralty law--of
proceeding in rem-bears no relationship to the action of deodand.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the method of proceeding that they
had in common sprang from different sources, and that any similarity
was largely accidental.' 1 3 Holmes, however, believed that the personi-
fication concepts of deodand and that of the maritime lien were con-
nected, although in the process of making the connection he offered
an entirely different sort of justification for deodand than those
explored in the previous Section. Holmes believed that "the fact of
motion" was the essential component of the deodand personification
fiction, and that it was this component of "motion" that also made the
concept of the maritime lien "intelligible."' 1 4
A ship is the most living of inanimate things.... [E]veryone'gives
a gender to vessels. And we need not be surprised, therefore, to
find a mode of dealing which has shown such extraordinary vitality
in the criminal law applied with even more striking thoroughness
in Admiralty. It is only by supposing the ship to have been treated
as if endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiar-
ities of the maritime law can be made intelligible, and on that sup-
position they at once become consistent and logical."1
5
In spite of this rather nimble attempt at reconciling the two doc-
trines," 6 Holmes recognized that perhaps other, practical motivations
were at work in the employment of the personification fiction in admi-
ralty law, practical motivations that were unique to the problems of
admiralty.
It may be admitted that, if this doctrine were not supported by an
the admiralty courts during this period had no jurisdiction over persons may explain why there
was no provision for a trial by jury. This suggests that the absence of a jury trial in modem
civil forfeiture is the result of an historical accident.
112. Note, supra note 24, at 780 & n.77. The English Navigation Acts were themselves seen
as fairly radical departures from the previous law because of the severity of the required
forfeiture, divorced by the Acts from any concept of culpability. Id. at 774-75. "Tlhe older
opinion [was] that the owner [of a ship] was not liable for the torts (and, presumably, by
analogy, the crimes) of the master and crew." 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 111, at 272.
113. See infra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
114. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 41, at 25-34.
115. Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added). One particularly interesting feature of the quotation in
text is Holmes's reference to the "criminal law." Given that the criminal forfeiture laws acted
in personam, Holmes must have been referring to deodand. This conclusion is also supported
by the fact that Holmes had been discussing the concept of deodand in the passages before the
one quoted. Holmes appears to have perceived deodand as essentially a criminal action.
116. Holmes's attempt to make the maritime rule "intelligible" by tying it to deodand has
been characterized as "'flims(y],' " resting up on scholarship that is "'ingenuous rather than




appearance of good sense, it would not have survived. The ship is
the only security available in dealing with foreigners, and rather
than send one's own citizens to search for a remedy abroad in
strange courts, it is easy to seize the vessel and satisfy the claim at
home, leaving the foreign owners to get their indemnity as they
may be able.'
1 7
Holmes's second argument is the one most commonly offered in
support of the admiralty rule. II In admiralty law, the personification
fiction reflected a slightly different purpose than those previously dis-
cussed in deodand. Gone is the whiff of superstition in its invocation,
although it still has a slightly archaic flavor. Instead, in admiralty,
the personification fiction appears to have been thought of as merely a
necessary procedural form, calculated to obtain jurisdictional control
over vessels whose cargo was contraband, or whose crew had commit-
ted some violation, but whose owners might be far away. "The pro-
cess of the Admiralty courts against the ship seems clearly to have
originated . .. as a ready and effectual means of compelling the
wrongdoer to appear and defend the action or make recompense." ' 9
Because owners might be far away, or difficult to ascertain, seizure
was perhaps the most appropriate and efficient remedy for violations
of the admiralty law. As one commentator put it, the procedure
reflected:
the essential condition of maritime traffic, namely, that it functions
largely in areas-the oceans-where sovereignty either does not
exist, or is in dispute .... The vessel alone, and its cargo, were
usually all that could be seized for the satisfaction of any claim or
as a forfeiture for any offense. 2 '
Although the difficulties inherent in obtaining jurisdiction over
ships apply with equal force in both the criminal and civil context,
Holmes' explanation focused on the problems presented to private
parties-that of "one's own citizens" searching abroad for a foreign
remedy in foreign courts. However, the early American cases most
often cited in support of the personification fiction in civil forfeiture,
117. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 41, at 28. Holmes's faith that a doctrine not "supported by
good sense" will not survive, may have been misplaced in this instance.
118. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 272. Holdsworth examined and rejected
Holmes's view that the maritime lien had its roots in the action of deodand. Instead he noted
that "this lien arose from the Admiralty process of arresting the ship in order to compel
payment." Id. See also infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
119. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 272 n.6 (citation omitted).
120. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 231. Note the importance Professor Finkelstein assigns
to the notion of "sovereignty." If indeed forfeiture is merely positive law at its purest, this
comment means that because there was no "sovereign" on the seas, neither was there any
"law."
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with its attendant constitutional disabilities, reveal that they almost
never involved the sort of problem with which Holmes was con-
cerned. These cases did not involve private parties seeking restitution
for some injury, but .rather, involved the government seeking forfei-
ture for the breach of some criminal law.
For example, in United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 121 the govern-
ment sought forfeiture of a merchant vessel and its cargo because of
acts of piracy committed by its captain that were in violation of
United States law.1 22 There was no question that the ship's American
owners had no knowledge of, nor did they consent to, the captain's
activities.1 23 Nevertheless, in a decision that surely represents a mas-
terpiece of "transcendental nonsense,"1 24 the United States Supreme
Court held the vessel forfeit, but "acquit[ted]" the cargo. 125 Justice
Story, writing for the Court, stated, "The vessel which commits the
aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing
to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to
the character or conduct of the owner." 126 He noted that this practice
was "not an uncommon course in the admiralty, acting under the law
of nations," as it was done "from the necessity of the case, as the only
adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an
indemnity to the injured party."
27
Justice Story's explanations for this practice are those later
articulated by Holmes. They are, however, inapposite. The Brig
Malek Adhel's owners were American, not foreign.12 1 What "neces-
sity" required dispensing with their innocence or guilt in any partici-
121. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
122. Id. at 220.
123. Id. at 237. Not only were the owners of the Brig Malek Adhel innocent of any
wrongdoing, counsel for the owners argued that even the captain was not responsible for his
own actions that strongly suggested that he was insane. Id. at 212-19. The Court, to the
contrary, found the captain's actions "cunning" and thought that there was "much method in
his mad projects," id. at 233, although a review of the testimony found at the beginning of the
case suggests otherwise. Id. at 212-29. If the captain had a piratical purpose, his peculiar
behavior and erratic actions indicate that he must have been a very unsuccessful pirate indeed.
He was apparently preoccupied not with larceny, but with getting his chronometer rated. Id.
124. The reference to "transcendental nonsense" is from an article by Professor Felix
Cohen, a noted legal realist. In the article, Professor Cohen criticized the legal profession's
reliance on "meaningless" metaphysical concepts and arguments, rather than on ones that
could be empirically proven, or that had their roots in "actual experience." Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 822-29
(1935). Professor Cohen's observations precisely describe the absurd reasoning of the doctrine
of civil forfeiture.
125. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 229-37.
126. Id. at 233.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 229.
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pation or approval of their captain's behavior? Admiralty's
"necessity of the case" seems to disappear when the owners are citi-
Zens. Furthermore, like Holmes, Justice Story offers the argument of
"indemnity" to injured parties as if this was a commercial case
between private parties. But the "injured party" in this case was the
government. Its "injury" was whatever intangible injury the govern-
ment suffers from a violation of the criminal law regarding piracy.
129
The tangible damages suffered were those of the other ships that
encountered the Brig Malek Adhel, some American, some not, which
the Brig Malek Adhel fired on and harassed.13° Nevertheless, the for-
feiture was to the government, not to those ships' passengers or
owners.
The early cases cited in support of civil forfeiture almost uni-
formly involve violations of the piracy acts,13 1 and laws against trad-
ing with the enemy.1 32  These are primarily crimes against the
government. In each of these cases, the party to be "indemnified" is
the government. Its motivation in exacting the "indemnity," how-
ever, looks more punitive in nature than remunerative. The propriety
of an in rem procedure to impose a punishment on a citizen for crimi-
nal acts was challenged in The Palmyra,133 a case that preceded Brig
Malek Adhel.134 The Palmyra Court held that a conviction under the
piracy law was not a necessary prerequisite to the forfeiture of a vessel
used to commit an act of piracy. 135 Justice Story, writing again for
the Court, noted that while many forfeitures required a prior convic-
tion, this was never "applied to seizures and forfeitures,... in rem,
cognizable on the revenue side of the Exchequer." '36
This justification, with its allusion to the government's power to
collect revenues, utterly fails to address the issue raised by the claim-
ant: that a civil forfeiture in this context is improper because its pur-
pose is more penal than remedial. The invocation of revenue,
however, raises an important point. As previously noted, forfeiture to
the government hardly aids our "own citizens" who have been injured
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., id. at 229; The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 1 (1827).
132. See, e.g., The Friendschaft, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 105 (1819); The Langdon Cheves, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 103 (1819); The Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 101 (1819); La Vengeance, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796).
133. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
134. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
135. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14-15.
136. Id at 14. The invocation of the "revenue" argument strikes a familiar chord. It harks
back to the earlier discussion of the abolition of deodand and Parliament's concern for the
protection of the deodand revenue. See supra note 99.
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by the negligence of the employees of the owners of foreign vessels, as
they recover nothing. In the early years of this country, prior to the
institution of the federal income tax, customs duties were a major
source of federal income.137 Thus, punishment by forfeiture for viola-
tions of these laws would indeed represent a protection of governmen-
tal revenues. Customs violations were, and are, regularly punished by
forfeiture.1 38 Since most trade presumably was transacted by ship at
that time, its easy to see how Justice Story may have felt that the
violation charged in The Palmyra was of this type.
However, the violation for which forfeiture was sought in The
Palmyra was piracy. 139 This is distinct from violations of customs
laws. The only tie criminal acts on the high seas have to customs
violations is that both involve ships. To be sure, failure to pay cus-
toms duties is often classified as a crime, as well as a civil violation. 44
Nevertheless, it is a crime of which the particular nature-failure to
pay-carries with it the appropriate punishment--collection and fines
through forfeiture. The government, in its proprietary function, has
been cheated and it collects. This cannot be said to be true of criminal
acts such as piracy where the persons who have suffered the loss do
not do the collecting. It is even less true of crimes such as trading
with the enemy, where the harm suffered is essentially political and,
thus, the extent of damages indeterminate. Justice Story appeared to
be lumping two distinct situations under the rubric of "revenue,"
where one of these situations seemed to have nothing at all to do with
revenue collection. 141 "It [forfeiture in this context] lacks all the ordi-
nary characteristics of a tax, whose primary function 'is to provide for
the support of the government,' and clearly involves the idea of pun-
ishment for infraction of the law-the definite function of a
penalty." 
142
Even taking Holmes's explanation at face value, and assuming
that the in rem form was necessary to protect American citizens from
137. At that time, customs duties constituted some 80% to 90% of federal revenues.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 33, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 712 (1960).
138. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1595(c) (1988) ("Any merchandise that is introduced or
attempted to be introduced into the United States contrary to law ... may be seized and
forfeited.").
139. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 2.
140. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1590(c)-(d) (1988).
141. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. The reference to the English courts of
the Exchequer may be an inappropriate analogy; the system of courts adopted in the United
States did not include a court of the exchequer. See Note, supra note 24, at 775-78.
142. United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto, 272 U.S. 321, 339 (1926) (Butler, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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having to seek out the negligent parties from around the globe, is his
explanation a satisfactory one? It is certainly "easier" to seize a for-
eign vessel and leave its foreign owners to deal with the problem of
"strange courts." This does not mean, however, that it is just. Two
justifications for the action are that a nation's first duty is to protect
the interests of its own citizens before protecting the interests of for-
eigners, and that, presumably, the foreigner chose to come here,
rather than the other way around. But once again, by protecting the
revenue laws, the government is only tangentially protecting its citi-
zens. In the case Brig Malek Adhel, the claimant owners were Ameri-
can citizens, not foreigners. Judging from the vigor with which they
pursued their claim, no doubt the owners regarded the government's
action in seizing and forfeiting their ship with a jaundiced eye and
would have been willing to do without the "protection."
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the devices that were appro-
priate in admiralty several hundred years ago may not be necessary in
an age of mass and instant world communication. Two hundred
years ago, the requirement that citizens or the government seek out
foreign owners around the globe for their indemnity would impose a
significant, if not impossible, burden. Surely, that is less true today.
This is not to say that the concerns that prompted the use of the per-
sonification fiction in admiralty have been totally overcome by the
technological developments of the modern world. At the very least,
however, they have been mitigated, and do not seem to justify the
retention of this archaic fiction. 4 3 As Holmes so powerfully stated:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.'"
Whatever the rationale, the admiralty law's in rem concepts still
are often analogized to other civil forfeiture laws as a justification for
143. As Judge Vance, dissenting in United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571,
1580 (11 th Cir. 1988) (en banc), put it: "The majority today... resuscitat[es] an anachronistic
and conceptually flawed rule of admiralty, and appl[ies] it to a modem forfeiture action where
it does not belong. I would take this en banc opportunity to rid this circuit of this dated
jurisdictional jetsam .... " Judge Vance nevertheless felt constrained to add the following
qualifier at the beginning of his opinion: "[M]y dissent in no way impinges on the activities of
federal officials in their war against narcotics importation." Id. at 1577 (emphasis added). But
of course it does. Judge Vance could hardly have meant to suggest that the legal fiction of a
proceeding in rem is anachronistic only as a jurisdictional concept, but is perfectly acceptable
to apply to what he frankly, and correctly, labeled "a penal proceeding." Id. at 1578. This is
an example of how the desire to eradicate drug trafficking leads to the desire to create "drug
exceptions." The inability of anyone (so far) to come up with a principled basis on which to
make such an exception creates corresponding intellectual boondoggles.
144. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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continuing the practice,145 even though the personification fiction has
fallen into disrepute in admiralty law itself.146
III. "TINKERING WITH THE MACHINERY"
Holmes's observation above applies with equal force to both of
the historical bases for civil forfeiture's personification fiction: admi-
ralty law and deodand. They are its most commonly cited historical
supports. Both justifications, however, are inadequate. Each offers
outdated rationalizations for imposing what is essentially a criminal
penalty47 under the guise of a civil proceeding.
[D]isguise the matter as we may, under whatever form of words, if
the intent which the owner of property carries in his bosom is the
gist of the thing on which the forfeiture turns, then the question is
one of the criminal law, and forfeiture is a penalty imposed for
crime, instead of being a [regulatory] forfeiture .. i.4'
Nevertheless, the courts persist in asserting that these actions may be
legitimately maintained as civil. Given the inadequacies and inconsis-
145. The connection between civil forfeiture and admiralty law may have survived, in part,
because Congress had few other procedural guidelines for the conduct of in rem proceedings
when it enacted these laws. Section 881 calls for the seizures of property subject to civil
forfeiture under that chapter to be effected by the Attorney General with warrants issued
"pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims .... " 21
U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988). This feature of the statute has caused no small outcry over the
applicability of admiralty procedures to civil forfeitures, inasmuch as the Supplemental Rules
provide for a clerk to issue an in rem arrest warrant ex parte, without any prior pleading or
determination of probable cause. See United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816
F.2d 1538, 1540 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (application of admiralty rules to section 881 has created "a
procedural morass"); United States v. Real Property Located at 25231 Mammoth circle, 659
F. Supp. 925, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (fourth amendment applies to civil forfeitures because of
forfeiture's "punitive" nature); United States v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. Single Premium Whole
Life Policy, 647 F. Supp. 732, 742 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (supplemental rules unconstitutional
when applied to section 881 forfeiture seizures); United States v. $128,035 in United States
Currency, 628 F. Supp. 668, 672-73 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (seizure without prior determination of
probable cause unconstitutional); Application of Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219, 223 (D.C. Mass.
1985) (even warrants issued under Admiralty Rule C require probable cause determination);
United States v. Certain Real Estate Property, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1497-98 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
(warrantless seizures under Supplemental Rule C unconstitutional absent exigent
circumstances). Whether these decisions represent voices crying out in the wilderness, or the
beginnings of a trend, is unclear. The sections complained of certainly have not been repealed.
146. See United States v. One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (Vance, J., dissenting) ("The [in rem admiralty] fiction has been severely criticized
during the past thirty years.") (citing Continental Grain Co. v. The Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S.
19, 23 (1960)).
147. Holmes may have found attractive the notion that an owner's guilt or innocence was
irrelevant to the government's ability to exact forfeiture, since he posited that the law was
moving away from moral standards to objective ones "from which the actual guilt of the party
concerned is wholly eliminated." O.W. HOLMES, supra note 41, at 38.
148. J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 703 (2d ed. 1858).
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tencies of the historical explanations, the modem attempts to justify a
civil forfeiture proceeding in rem that disregards the "intent which
the owner carries in his bosom," must be examined.
A. The Civil/Criminal Distinction
The search for a modem justification for civil forfeiture finds the
courts, for the most part, twisting and turning in an effort to avoid
identifying the only purposes of the action as punitive and deter-
rent. ' 4 9 Even the courts, which acknowledge that one of the purposes
of section 881 is to deter crime, strive to find additional purposes
which can be more comfortably fit into a civil context. 50 The diffi-
culty is finding a meaningful way to distinguish between civil and
criminal penalties.
149. In some opinions, the Supreme Court has disingenuously suggested that civil
forfeiture's goals are only remedial, thus removing it from the criminal sphere altogether. See,
e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (forfeiture is
intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff regulations; therefore, it is remedial rather than
punitive); United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321, 327 (1926) (forfeiture of car for
violation of the National Prohibition Act described as a "tax"); Dobbin's Distillery v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395, 399 (1877) (forfeiture is not a criminal penalty where "information...
does not involve the personal conviction of the wrong-doer for the offence charged" in order to
impose the penalty). This last rationale, which simply restates the procedural posture of the
case without justifying it, is clearly tautological.
In others cases, the Court has acknowledged that crime deterrence was one of the goals of
the forfeiture laws. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687-
88 (1974) (forfeiture laws impose an economic penalty on illegal behavior with the intent of
rendering it unprofitable); United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-
22 (1971) (forfeitures are intended as a penalty "only upon those who are significantly involved
in a criminal enterprise"); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700
(1965) (a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal).
150. See supra note 149. It is not universally true that courts have resisted acknowledging a
crime deterrence purpose in the forfeiture statutes. Startlingly enough, at times a court has
acknowledged the basic criminal nature of the proceeding without attempting to justify it at
all. Consider the following:
Although the facts [in a civil forfeiture] relate to violations of criminal law, the
government is not subject to the burdens traditionally associated with criminal
trials. To the contrary, the government's burden is comparatively easy, even for
a civil case. It only need establish probable cause, which is defined as a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt supported by less than prima facie proof but
more than mere suspicion. . .
In proving its case, the government is permitted to use certain types of
evidence that is normally excluded in criminal proceedings. Specifically, hearsay
evidence is admissable to prove probable cause in a civil forfeiture proceeding.
United States v. One 1977 36 Foot Cigarette Ocean Racer, 624 F. Supp. 290, 295 (S.D. Fla.
1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Apparently it never occurred to the court to ques-
tion the propriety of this doctrine. See also United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Located
at 7715 Betsy Bruce La., 906 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that hearsay evidence is
admissable in civil forfeiture context); United States v. Certain Real Property, 910 F.2d 343,
353 n.3 (6th Cir. 1990) (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (claiming that crime deterrence is a "reme-
dial purpose").
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The term "civil forfeiture" is, in and of itself, something of an
oxymoron. One authority defines "civil" as: "Relating to private
rights and remedies sought by civil actions as contrasted with criminal
proceedings."'151 By comparison, "forfeiture" has been defined as
"[s]omething to which the right is lost by the commission of a crime or
fault or the losing of something by way of penalty."' 52 These defini-
tions suggest that the terms are mutually exclusive.' 53 Modem civil
forfeiture has little to do with private rights or remedies. Further-
more, the issue of fault is marginalized in the doctrine's operation and
irrelevant in its conceptualization. While colloquial usage makes the
terms "punishment" and "penalty" somewhat interchangeable, in the
law they are often characterized as distinct. "Penalties," as the term
is used in the civil context, are almost exclusively monetary in
nature.' 54 Often, the imposition of monetary penalties is seen as not
requiring the constitutional scrutiny essential to the imposition of
criminal penalties such as incarceration. 55 Nevertheless, there must
be some constitutional limit on the government's power to inflict a
151. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
152. Id at 585 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Batre, 69 F.2d 673
(9th Cir. 1934) (term "penalty" is substantially synonymous with the word "forfeiture," which
indicates a punishment for a violation of the law). It should be noted that the 6th edition of
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY splits the definitions of forfeiture into several separate types: "A
deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence of the nonperformance of some obligation
or condition. Loss of some right or property as a penalty for some illegal act. Loss of property
or money because of breach of a legal obligation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
150, at 650 (emphasis added). This Comment retains the earlier definition because it contains
essentially the same information put more succinctly.
153. If the definitions of "civil" and "forfeiture" are not mutually exclusive, then they
suggest that civil forfeiture should at least be subject to very strict scrutiny. In fact, it has been
stated that as a "harsh" doctrine, civil forfeiture must be "strictly construed." See, e.g.,
United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft, 671 F.2d 414, 417 (10th
Cir. 1982) ("Forfeitures are clearly not favored and are to be enforced only when within both
the spirit and letter of the law."); United States v. One 1981 Cadillac Eldorado, 535 F. Supp.
65, 67 (1982) (forfeitures not favored, therefore section 881 must be strictly construed). But
see United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 12 (1890) (forfeiture of real estate and other property,
as penalty for running an illegal still, is a penalty for revenue evasion and therefore is not to be
strictly construed); United States v. Batre, 69 F.2d 673, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1934) (generally
forfeiture statutes are strictly construed, but statutes should prevent fraud on revenues to be
"fairly and reasonably" construed).
154. See Clark, supra note 16, at 397-413. The category of "civil penalties" does, however,
include things besides fines and forfeitures, such as the loss of a drivers license, loss of public
office, and loss of citizenship. Id. While penalties for "petty offenses" such as traffic violations
do not normally raise constitutional issues, id. at 397-401, laws that impose more severe
penalties such as deportation often raise problems that parallel those raised in the context of
civil forfeiture. Id. at 487-88.
155. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 n.2 and 402 n.6 (1938) (an example
of a "remedial" sanction is deportation; Congress may not provide civil procedure for
enforcement of punitive sanctions).
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severe monetary penalty without the protections of the criminal pro-
cess. Civil forfeiture tests those limits.
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,"5 ' Justice Goldberg attempted
to summarize all the criteria previously used by the Court into a com-
prehensive list 157 in order to distinguish between sanctions that were
essentially penal and those which were legitimately civil in nature. In
so doing, he noted that "this problem has been extremely difficult and
elusive of solution,"'' 15 and that while all of the tests were "relevant to
the inquiry,"' 59 many of them "point in differing directions.""lw The
traditional tests were:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
[4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned .... 61
Applied to civil forfeiture, these tests indeed "point in different
directions."' 62  Even at their most straightforward, without dealing
with the difficult questions of definitions for words like "punishment"
or "disability," the tests are inconclusive. 63 More fundamentally,
some of the tests are question-begging. For example, asking whether
a punishment is applied only upon a finding of scienter is really only
another way of asking what does the statute say. Asking whether the
statute makes scienter an element of the charge is not the same as
asking whether it ought to do so.
Similarly circular is the inquiry into whether something histori-
cally has been regarded as a punishment. To the extent that the con-
156. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
157. Id. at 168-69.
158. Id. at 169.
159. Id.
160. Id
161. Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
162. Id. at 169.
163. Civil forfeiture does not impose a disability or a restraint on the person as those
concepts are defined in the cases. "Restraint" in general means imprisonment, see Clark, supra
note 16, at 401-03, and "disability" usually refers to a civil disability such as the loss of
citizenship involved in Kennedy. See id. at 487. Presumably, the Court has felt that to define
"disability" to include any monetary exaction or property loss would expand the category of
penal sanctions too greatly, and that the takings clause of the fifth amendment was meant to
protect persons from government overreaching in this area.
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cept of civil forfeiture has a long history,'" the answer to that
question is no. This inquiry, though, ignores both the question of
whether civil forfeiture is experienced 165 as a punishment, and
whether civil forfeiture, as distinct from forfeiture in general, histori-
cally has been considered an anomaly to the general rule that a forfei-
ture is a punishment.' 6
The most relevant question is what is the purpose of the statute?
If it is crime deterrence, and the penalty exacted by the statute is
severe,167 then it ought not to be imposed without the constitutional
protections afforded to the criminal defendant. It is beyond dispute
that among the aims of civil forfeiture under section 881 are deter-
rence and retribution. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing,'
6
8
the Court noted that civil forfeiture of vehicles, for violation of the
drug laws, "fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal
statutes, both by preventing further illicit use of the conveyance and
by imposing a economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior
unprofitable."' ' 9 Legislative history supports the Court's finding.
70
Given the undeniable elements of crime deterrence and retribution in
the civil forfeitures statutes, the last two tests posed in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez,'7 ' whether the statute has an alternate purpose
and whether the punishment imposed does not appear excessive,
72
are determinate.
B. Civil Forfeiture Justified as "Remedial"
Perhaps disturbed by the constitutional ramifications of the
expansion of forfeiture laws which rest on the fragile historical sup-
164. See supra notes 75-108 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of deodand).
165. It would be difficult to argue that civil forfeiture is not experienced as a punishment by
those upon whom it is imposed.
166. Blackstone lumps deodand and admiralty forfeiture in with the more common
statutory forfeitures for crimes, and he generally refers to forfeiture as resulting from
"transgressi[ons]." See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *299. Holmes appears to have
shared this notion of forfeiture as a penal sanction when he refers to deodand as part of the
"criminal law." See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 41, at 26-27.
167. Determining what is "severe" is fraught with difficulty. Any line-drawing on the basis
of a specific dollar amount is bound to be arbitrary. The amount of money a successful
attorney thinks constitutes a "severe" penalty is bound to differ from the amount a welfare
recipient considers "severe." However, this sort of line-drawing is a familiar legal exercise.
168. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
169. Id., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974).
170. "It was hoped that through the use of current criminal and civil forfeiture provisions,
forfeiture would become a powerful weapon in the fight against drug trafficking and
racketeering." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 44, at 194, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3377.
171. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
172. Id. at 168-69.
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ports explored above,17 3 and in light of the purposes of crime deter-
rence identified, the courts have attempted to articulate more
substantial justifications for proceeding in rem. The most commonly
cited rationale is that civil forfeiture is a "remedial" measure, and
thus subject to less constitutional scrutiny.1 74 However, there is no
clear definition of what constitutes a "remedial" sanction. 75 The best
definition one is able to glean from the caselaw is that "remedial"
equals "not criminal."'' 76 The Court has, at various times, defined the
following purposes as "remedial" with respect to civil forfeiture: (1)
it is justified by necessity or exigent circumstances; (2) it serves as a
form of liquidated damages or tax; and (3) it serves as a deterrent to
negligent entrustment of property. Each of these justifications is,
upon closer examination, unconvincing. 
7 7
1. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,171 the Court
offered, among others, the following justification for forfeiture as a
civil proceeding: "[Florfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement
of tariff regulations. It prevents forbidden merchandise from circulat-
ing in the United States .... [I]n other contexts we have recognized
that such purposes characterize remedial rather than punitive sanc-
tions."'179 In adhering to the policy that civil forfeiture was remedial
and regulatory, the decision in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones was con-
sistent with most of the Court's precedent.' The "forbidden mer-
173. See supra notes 73-146 and accompanying text (discussing deodand and admiralty).
174. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688 (forfeiture's "remedial" purposes legitimate its
civil posture, but its crime deterrence purpose renders it not a "taking"); One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (forfeiture is remedial not punitive; it provides a
source of revenue to enforce the law, liquidated damages for violations of the law, and keeps
contraband out of circulation); In Re Various Items of Personal Property, 282 U.S. 577 (1931)
(constitutional protections do not apply because the proceeding is one in rem).
175. See Clark, supra note 16, at 385-91.
176. Id. at 391; see also supra note 174. As one commentator has put it, "[a]lthough
commentary has struggled to extract a rule . . . to explicate the Court's punitive-remedial
distinction, no coherent explanation has thus far emerged .... More than one academic critic
has... given up hope of formulating an explanation .... Clark, supra note 16, at 390-91.
177. See infra notes 178-265 and accompanying text.
178. 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
179. Id. at 237.
180. But see United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971)
("When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended
to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.");
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1965) (forfeiture proceeding
is "quasi-criminal"... clearly [a] penalty for criminal offense"); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (forfeiture grounded on alleged offenses "committed by [the defendant],
though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal"); Coffey v. United States, 116
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chandise" argument has been commonly invoked. This justification
might be characterized as one form of an "exigent circumstances"
argument.""1 Included in the exigent circumstances analysis are a
variety of situations that, at first glance, may seem distinct: (1) pro-
tection of the general public from dangerous products; (2) regulatory
control over banned substances; and (3) the exercise of extraordinary
remedies during war.
a. Imminent Danger
The first of the categories of the "forbidden merchandise" argu-
ment involves the government's right to confiscate, as a regulatory
measure, misbranded drugs, spoiled food, and other items that consti-
tute a "danger to the public."1 2 When an imminent danger exists
that such items constitute a risk to the public, the government, in its
sovereign capacity (so the argument goes), has a legitimate interest in
seizing them and preventing them from circulating. The risk to the
public of misbranded drugs or spoiled food is physical harm. It is the
danger of physical harm to the public that justifies the forfeiture as
the only adequate remedy. However, this argument would seem diffi-
cult to apply in the case of a car forfeited because of the presence of
some illegal narcotics.
b. Contraband
In the second category of "forbidden merchandise," contraband
per se,18 3 the justification for forfeiture is that possession of the thing
itself violates some articulated public policy. Because possession of
contraband is illegal by statute, citizens are not deemed to have any
property interest in it which could be violated by its forfeiture.8 4 Per-
U.S. 436, 444-45 (1886) (acquittal on criminal charges, based on same set of facts on which
subsequent civil forfeiture based, bars civil forfeiture).
181. This use of "exigent circumstances" is distinct from, but related to, that term as it is
used with respect to searches and seizures. Each of the theories categorized in this Comment
as falling under the "exigent circumstances" heading relies on the presence of some element of
danger or emergency to justify forfeiture.
182. See, e.g., North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
183. Contraband per se, also known as malum in se, is something of which the mere
possession is illegal and in which there can be no property interest. Some examples of
contraband per se include heroin, cocaine, counterfeit currency, and certain types of firearms.
See Clark, supra note 16, at 478-79 and accompanying notes. If the personification fiction had
any remaining vitality, it might best be found with respect to contraband per se; there is a sort
of logical symmetry between the notion of a guilty thing and that which is prohibited by its
nature. Conceptual problems arise with respect to goods for which the appropriate duties have
not been paid-a category perhaps closer to the "instrumentalities" definition than contraband
per se. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
184. See Calero Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974) (civil
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haps one could argue that contraband per se represents those items
that the government has determined to be a "danger" to the public,
and that the first and second categories overlap. With some of these
items, however, the danger may or may not be imminent, physical
harm. Nevertheless, there at least exists an argument that items des-
ignated contraband per se often are, in and of themselves, "danger-
ous." Narcotics, illegal weapons, and alcohol (during Prohibition)
fall into this category.'8 5
Alternatively, contraband may merely be something that repre-
sents a threat to governmental authority, such as counterfeit money,
passports, or other governmental documents, the circulation of which
would perhaps undermine public confidence in the government.8 6
Arguably, such items also represent an imminent danger to the public
to the extent that the security of, or confidence in, the government is
undermined. This reasoning breaks down, however, once one moves
away from either contraband per se or items that are otherwise dan-
gerous, such as spoiled food, and begins to include instrumentali-
ties, 18 7 derivative contraband,' proceeds,"8 9 derivative proceeds,' 90
forfeiture not a taking). The concept of contraband is obviously a legal fiction. No doubt
possessors of illegal narcotics very much mind if the government takes their drugs. However,
few are likely to have a problem with the employment of the fiction of contraband unless they
object to the categorization without regard to such takings, as for example those who believe
marijuana should be legalized. In that case, the forfeiture of the contraband upon discovery of
possession is, as this Comment demonstrates, probably the least of one's objections.
185. The argument that items are designated by law as contraband because they are
dangerous applies to things which are not deemed contraband, such as tobacco and alcohol.
Whatever one's views on the legalization of drugs, it is difficult to deny that narcotics are
dangerous. Nevertheless, the determination as to what is legal and what is not seems fairly
arbitrary and sensitive to prevailing customs, attitudes, and moral values. For example, many
of the civil forfeiture cases that constitute the precedent that validates forfeiture were decided
during Prohibition and involved violations of the liquor laws. See, e.g., Dodge v. United States
272 U.S. 530 (1926); United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321 (1926). It is easy to draw
parallels between Prohibition and the current "War on Drugs"-not the least of which may be
their respective futility.
186. Presumably there are limits upon the government's ability to designate things as
contraband. One way to identify contraband per se might be to say that if the government
must destroy the item, or if it is clearly not in the government's best interest to have the item(s)
in circulation, then it is contraband. If the government can re-sell the item after the forfeiture,
then it is probably not contraband per se. Under this formula, counterfeit money and illegal
drugs would be contraband per se (although an exception might be made for certain permitted
usages of illegal drugs, such as for research, or for use in police sting operations); illegally
imported clothing would not. This is not the formulation that the courts have adopted.
187. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(3)-(4) (1988); see also infra note 192.
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1988).
189. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6) (1988).
190. See id. The terms "proceeds" and "derivative proceeds" are sometimes used
interchangeably. See United States v. Real Property Located at 25231 Mammoth Circle, 659
F. Supp. 925 (1987).
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and substitute proceeds. 9 '
The term "instrumentalities" refers to property that is used to
facilitate a violation of the law.' 92 It has tended in the past to be
limited, for the most part, to vehicles that were used to transport ille-
gal goods. 93 Part of the justification for seizure offered in such cases
was exigent circumstances: Vehicles are mobile and evidence would
be destroyed if the government did not immediately seize them. But
this argument does not distinguish between a rationale for seizure and
one for forfeiture. 94 There is a fairly significant difference between
having property temporarily seized as evidence and having it perma-
nently taken away.' 95
191. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988).
192. Even the most casual review of the case law reveals that the majority of forfeiture cases
involve forfeiture of some sort of vehicle; generally, boats, cars, or airplanes. See, e.g., United
States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (virtually every case
cited by the court involves a car). Indeed, mobility was initially seen as a partial limitation on
"instrumentality" forfeiture, beyond paraphernalia. See supra notes 26, 61-63 and
accompanying text. With the 1984 legislation that amended § 881 to include real property and
proceeds, this limitation vanished. See supra note 63.
193. See cases cited in United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383
(W.D. Pa. 1979).
194. See United States v. Parcel of Land and Residence, 914 F.2d 1, 4 n.10 (1st Cir. 1990)
(noting that the government in this case "seems to confuse probable cause to forfeit and
probable cause to seize").
195. "Exigent circumstances" has been established as a valid exception to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the Court found that the Puerto Rican
government's seizure of a yacht was justified, in part, by the fact that the boat, since it was
mobile, could be easily moved from the jurisdiction. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974).
The argument advanced in Calero-Toledo to justify seizure without pre-seizure notice or
hearing is reminiscent of the "motion" concept that so fascinated Holmes, leading him to
believe that the personification fiction was justified by the aspect of motion. See supra notes
114-16 and accompanying text. However, this notion of movement, or the fear that property
will be taken from the jurisdiction, only justifies the thing's warrantless seizure, not its
forfeiture. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent, the seizure in Calero-Toledo took
place two months after the government had found the marijuana. Id at 691 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The purpose of the seizure in that case was not to search the vessel, but to forfeit
it. It is difficult to understand what sort of "exigency" requires forfeiture, even in the case of
moveable property. It is even more difficult to understand in the context of immovable
property. Nevertheless, in a recent case, the government tried to invoke just this argument to
justify seizure of real property, for purposes of forfeiture, without notice or an opportunity for
a hearing. United States v. Certain Real Estate Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway
("Spina"), 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1476 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1985). The court rejected the government's
argument and found that no exigent circumstances existed with respect to the real property
because it was not going anywhere. "[W]here the property is large and immovable (e.g., land
and the buildings thereon), and the likelihood of it being concealed or destroyed is remote,
there is no overriding need for 'prompt action' which would sacrifice the property owner's
right to procedural due process." Id. at 1496. This case does not, however, appear to
represent the majority opinion on this issue: section 881 does not require pre-seizure notice or
hearing, regardless of the property's mobility. 21 U.S.C § 881(b) (1988). The statute
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Furthermore, it is important to remember that "words are more
plastic than wax." '196 Almost anything may be termed an "instrumen-
tality," even though the term initially was restricted to vehicles. As a
matter of plain meaning, assuming a person wants to move illegal sub-
stances from point A to point B, and uses a car or other vehicle to do
so, the word "instrumentality" makes sense. The vehicle is "instru-
mental" in facilitating the crime-transportation and possession of an
illegal substance. The argument becomes more attenuated when, for
instance, a home is forfeited because an illegal drug sale took place in
the driveway. 197 In such a case, it is difficult to understand how the
fact that the transaction took place in the driveway is anything more
than fortuitous. These arguments would seem to apply with even
greater force to the categories of derivative contraband, proceeds,
derivative proceeds, and substitute proceeds. Since these categories,
by definition, constitute neither contraband per se, nor are likely to be
used in any meaningful sense to facilitate any violations of the law,
any argument of "exigency" for their forfeiture collapses.
However, as previously mentioned, the justification for forfeiture
rests, not on an argument of facilitation, but rather, on the legal fic-
tion of "taint." The argument is that the car, boat, house, or cash in
question has been "tainted" by the presence of an illegal substance, or
by the commission of an illegal act, and is, therefore, subject to forfei-
ture. 98 Once the legal fiction of "taint" is employed, one moves away
from the notion that the government's action is justified by some sort
of exigent circumstances, or imminent danger. As the Court so aptly
noted in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,'99
There is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automo-
alternatively requires: (1) warrants issued pursuant to the admiralty rules, 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)
(1988) (at one time these rules presumably did deal with moveable objects), that do not require
notice or even probable cause; or (2) that the Attorney General have probable cause to believe
the property is forfeitable, 21 U.S.C. § 881(bX4) (1988). Thus, the same probable cause which
justifies property's seizure justifies its forfeiture. "Forfeiture actions are unique in that they are
the only proceedings where the government may confiscate private property on a mere
showing of probable cause." United States v. One Lear Jet, 836 F.2d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (Vance, J., dissenting). Other courts have noted this problem. See United
States v. $152,160 in United States Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354, 357 (D. Colo. 1988) (citing
Spina with approval); United States v. Real Property Located at 25231 Mammoth Circle, 659
F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. $128,035 in United States Currency, 628 F.
Supp. 668 (S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 806 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1986); Application of
Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1985), appeal dismissed, 802 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1986).
196. American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 11 (5th Cir.
1974) (citation omitted).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Real Property and Residence at 3097 S.W. 111th Ave., 699
F. Supp. 287, 288 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
198. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
199. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
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bile. It is only the alleged use to which this particular automobile
was put that subjects [the claimant] to its possible loss .... Fur-
thermore, the return of the automobile to the owner would not
subject him to any possible criminal penalties for possession or
frustrate any public policy concerning automobiles, as
automobiles.2"
What the "taint" doctrine really represents is an evidentiary pre-
sumption. That is, if a car is found to contain illegal substances, it is
logical to assume that the owner had knowledge of their presence, if,
indeed, he did not put them there in the first place. Since there is no
public policy or exigency that requires prohibiting cars as cars, the
purpose of forfeiting the car must be to punish the owner for what is,
on the basis of this assumption, his probable wrongdoing. In employ-
ing the "taint" doctrine, the government simply is declining to test
this assumption in the individual case. Instead, it relies on a presump-
tion of guilt as to the underlying behavior that is sought to be sup-
pressed. The "taint" doctrine has nothing at all to do with
"exigency" unless one posits that it would over-strain governmental
resources to prosecute thepeople involved, rather than looking to their
property, in order to punish them.
c. War Powers
There is a third, albeit minor, strand of the exigent circumstances
argument. This third line of argument suggests that in times of war,
or other national emergency, the government must be empowered to
take the sort of extreme action represented by forfeiture which it
might not otherwise legitimately take because war is itself an exigent
circumstance. However, this justification was employed in times
when there was no war.
In Dodge v. United States,20 1 the Court relied on an early Ameri-
can opinion, The Caledonian,20 2 to support the proposition that a
property which was subject to forfeiture did not need to be seized by
the government in order for the seizure to be effective.20 3 In Dodge,
Justice Holmes paraphrases The Caledonian Court, writing that
"anyone may seize any property for a forfeiture to the Government,
and.., if the Government adopts the act and proceeds to enforce the
forfeiture by legal process, this is of no less validity than when the
seizure is by authority originally given. "2  It should be noted that The
200. Id. at 699.
201. 272 U.S. 530 (1926).
202. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 100 (1819).
203. Dodge, 272 U.S. at 532 (citing The Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 103).
204. Id. at 532 (emphasis added). Holmes went on to write that this principle "embod[ied]
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Caledonian is one of a series of cases20 5 that involve charges of dealing
with the enemy. In each case, the ships had been seized for dealing
with the British during the War of 1812.2oe In justifying the forfei-
ture, Justice Story wrote that "the right of the government to the for-
feiture . . . arises from its general authority to seize all enemies'
property coming into our ports during war."207 Although Justice
Story's argument about the exigencies of war may explain the govern-
ment's right to seize foreign ships, and by analogy, Justice Holmes's
argument about the validity of the seizure in Dodge, neither of these
arguments seem to advance any justification for forfeiture.20 ' The
Dodge Court apparently did not find any such distinction and laid
down startling precedent-a special "forfeiture exception" to the war-
rant requirement.2 ' 9 The breadth of the holding suggests that one's
neighbors could make a forfeiture seizure as long as the government
"adopted" the seizure by instituting forfeiture proceedings.
The exercise of war powers21 ° by the government is generally
good sense" and upheld the forfeiture in Dodge. Id. However he added in a somewhat cryptic
aside that "[t]he exclusion of evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure stand[s] on a
different ground." I.d The seizure in Dodge was made by police officers of the city of
Providence, Rhode Island. Id. at 531. The claimant argued that they were not "officers of the
law" as defined by the relevant provision of the National Prohibition Act. Id. Rather than
broadly hold that anyone may effect a valid seizure if the government "adopts" it, it would
seem to have been easier to simply find that the statute meant what it said by "any officer of
the law."
205. The Supreme Court decided The Caledonian along with The Friendschaft, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 105 (1819), and The Langdon Cheves, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 103 (1819).
206. Even though the cases were not decided until 1819, well after the war was over, the
seizures were made during the war, in 1813 and 1814. See The Friendschaft, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 105; The Langdon Cheves, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 104; The Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 101. It is not entirely clear whether the ships involved were engaged in trading
with the enemy. In The Langdon Cheves, the Court apparently assumed from the fact that the
ship was captured by the enemy and then released after six weeks rather than condemned as
prize that it was engaged in trade with the enemy. From the recitation of the facts, it is not
obvious that the Langdon Cheves and its crew were anything more than unfortunate enough to
have been captured and then released unharmed, only to have their ship and cargo forfeited by
their own side.
207. The Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 102 (emphasis added). Justice Story goes on to
add that the government's power to exact forfeiture in this case also stems "from its authority
to enforce a forfeiture against its own citizens, whenever the property comes within its reach."
Id. Justice Story may have referred, in this context, to enforcing a forfeiture against citizens
dealing with the British. However, the sentence could be read to mean any forfeiture
whatsoever.
208. Given that the Dodge seizure was not made during wartime, the Court's reliance on a
war powers argument calls into question the appropriateness of the analogy.
209. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
210. The Caledonian, while explicitly invoking the war powers, does not stand alone. Other
cases have invoked this power implicitly. See, e.g., United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 210 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). Both cases involved alleged
acts of piracy. In particular, in the case of The Palmyra, attacks were made on American
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conceded to be broad. 11 Nevertheless, any seizures made under these
powers are inapposite to peacetime seizures and forfeitures, notwith-
standing any of the metaphors employed, such as that the government
is waging "a war on drugs.12 12 Furthermore, an historical review of
governmental excesses approved under the rubric of the war pow-
ers21 3 suggests that this justification must be sharply limited. It is a
rationale without any stopping place-allowing the government to
suppress disfavored behavior with impunity by invoking "war" or a
national emergency.
Not surprisingly, once one analyzes the arguments for forfeiture
of "forbidden merchandise" in exigent circumstances, one realizes
that they do not justify the modem civil forfeiture with which this
Comment is concerned. Even though the imminent danger and regu-
lation of contraband rationales would justify seizure and forfeiture of
dangerous or illegal property to protect the public, they still do not
provide a compelling rationale for forfeiture of anything but those
items. Furthermore, the argument for the relaxation of the warrant
requirement in emergency circumstances fails to justify seizure of
immovable property. Finally, forfeiture based on exigent circum-
stances in times of war should not be expanded to include forfeitures
to fight the metaphoric war on drugs.
2. TAXATION AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The next argument advanced in the search for a modern justifica-
tion for civil forfeiture is that the purpose of civil forfeiture is corn-
vessels and citizens. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 2. These situations do not appear far removed
from an exercise of the war powers. Attacks on American vessels or citizens while at sea, in an
area where sovereignty does not operate, are viewed more as hostile acts against the nation
than as independent harms. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
211. Notwithstanding the fairly broad power allowed the government during times of war
or national emergency, Professor Laurence Tribe has noted: "The American Constitution
contains no language providing for the Constitution's general suspension, or for its
replacement by an alternative set of principles or powers, during times of national crisis,
however severe." L. Tribe, Memorandum to Authors of the Constitution for the Czech and
Slovak Federated Republic (Jan. 8, 1991) (unpublished manuscript available in University of
Miami Law Review files).
212. The metaphor of a "war on drugs" is a very powerful one, and to the extent that the
drug enforcement campaign has been militarized, it is not mere rhetoric. See Wisotsky, supra
note 60, at 893, 919-20. "By amending the Posse Comitatus Act in 1981 and authorizing the
Navy to interdict smuggling vessels at sea, Congress inflicted the first breach in the century-old
wall of separation between civilian and military law enforcement roles." Id at 919-20 (citing
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982)).
213. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (authorizing the internment
of Japanese-Americans in concentration camps during World War II); Schenk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (ruling that criminal conviction for publication and distribution of
pamphlets criticizing the draft does not violate first amendment).
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214 "1213pensatory, either as a tax or fine, or as "liquidated damages.
Thus, the argument goes, these forfeitures may be conducted properly
as civil actions. Much of the modem groundwork for this approach
evolved during Prohibition.
When Congress passed the National Prohibition Act, outlawing
the manufacture, sale, or transportation of alcoholic beverages, it
apparently failed to repeal the many ancillary taxes and customs dues
relating to alcohol, or the laws calling for forfeiture for violations of
these laws.216 In light of the existence of these laws, which arguably
conflicted with the National Prohibition Act, the claimant in United
States v. One Ford Coupe217 argued that forfeiture under these laws
was no longer an enforcement of the government's revenue collecting
powers, but instead acted as a penalty.21" The claimant argued that
"the enactment of the National Prohibition Act changed the purpose
of the tax [forfeiture] from raising revenue to preventing manufacture,
sale, and transportation" of illegal alcohol. 21 9  Therefore, when
imposed as a penalty on an innocent third party, it violated due pro-
cess. 2 2 0 Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, was not persuaded.
He noted:
It is true that the use of the word "tax" in imposing a financial
burden does not prove conclusively that the burden imposed is a
tax; and that when it appears from its very nature that the imposi-
tion prescribed is a penalty solely, it must be treated in law as
such.22'
Nevertheless, he wrote, "A tax on intoxicating liquor does not cease to
be such because the sovereign has declared that none shall be manufac-
tured, and because its main purpose in retaining the tax is to make law-
breaking less profitable.'222 The Court also did not find illogical that
one's vehicle could be forfeited as a result of an attempt either to
remove liquor from the place where the tax should have been paid, or
214. See, e.g., United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321, 327 (1926) (no conflict
between National Prohibition Act's protection of innocent persons from forfeiture for
transportation of illegal alcohol (§ 26), and tax forfeiture statute (§ 3450), which made no such
provision for innocent owners in forfeiture action based on transportation of tax unpaid liquor,
because forfeiture is a "tax").
215. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
216. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49 (1932); United
States v. Commercial Credit Co. 286 U.S. 63 (1932); United States v. The Ruth Mildred, 286
U.S. 67 (1932); General Import & Export Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 70 (1932).
217. 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
218. Id. at 328.
219. Id.
220. Id at 328.
221. Id
222. Id. (emphasis added).
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to conceal liquor from the taxing authorities, when such places to pay
taxes or tax authorities no longer existed.223 That tax stamps for
liquor were no longer obtainable and that no officer was authorized to
receive payment of the taxes were merely "supervening obstacles to
paying the tax," and did not reflect Congressional intent to discon-
tinue the tax.224 Finally, the government's taxation motive was not
rendered less persuasive by the fact that the seizure was effected by
the prohibition director, rather than an internal revenue officer.225
Section 26 of the National Prohibition Act contained an innocent
owner exception from forfeiture.226 The various tax and customs stat-
utes did not.227 Without provision for innocent owners, the tax stat-
ute employed in One Ford Coupe obviously would result in more
forfeitures to the government than the similar provision under the
National Prohibition Act. However, the government did not limit
itself to invoking the tax laws. As it transpired, with very little inge-
nuity on the government's part, almost any seizure of a vehicle could
be brought under the rubric of "revenue" because the Court narrowly
defined "transportation" within the National Prohibition Act.228 The
definition of "transporation" under the Act did not include tax eva-
sion and failure to pay import duties, even though there may have
been elements of "transporation" to these violations.229 Thus, the
National Prohibition Act offered no protection to the innocent owner
in the case of the importation of alcohol in violation of the customs or
navigation laws.230 These decisions may explain why the government
brought many Prohibition forfeiture cases under the taxing or cus-
toms laws.231 Nevertheless, the Court's various arguments in these
223. Id. at 327, 329.
224. Id. at 327.
225. Id. at 325.
226. See General Motors Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 59 n.* (1932). The innocent
owner section of the National Prohibition Act gave the owner an opportunity to present "good
cause" why his property should be returned and protected innocent lienholders. Id.
Significantly, claimants in this case and the one that follows it, United States v. Commercial
Credit Co., 286 U.S. 63 (1932), were the lienholders of the forfeited cars.
227. See General Motors Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. at 59-61.
228. Id. at 59 (1932).
229. Id.
230. United States v. Commercial Credit Co. 286 U.S. 63, 65 (1931) (fact that liquor was
transferred to a different vehicle once in the United States did not change essential character of
violation from "importation" to "transportation"); General Motors, 286 U.S. at 57; United
States v. The Ruth Mildred, 286 U.S. 67, 69 (1931) (because forfeited ship's license was for
fishing, ship was forfeitable for presence of liquor; ship would have also been forfeitable had it
contained "wheat or silk or sugar").
231. See United States v. One Chevrolet Truck, 79 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1935); United States
v. One Chevrolet Sedan, 12 F. Supp. 793 (W.D.N.Y. 1935); Beaudry v. United States, 79 F.2d
650 (5th Cir. 1935).
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cases are unconvincing. Forfeiture "lacks all the ordinary character-
istics of a tax, whose primary function 'is to provide for the support of
the government,' and clearly involves the idea of punishment for
infraction of the law-the definite function of a penalty.1232
More recently, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 233
the Court invoked the revenue argument in a footnote in its character-
ization of forfeiture as providing a source of funding for law enforce-
ment activities. 234  The Court did not argue that random and
arbitrary forfeiture is a legitimate means of taxation. Rather, it
argued that forfeiture is meant as "compensation" to government, a
form of "liquidated damages."
The concept of liquidated damages is a familiar one in contract
law. The idea is that the parties to a contract may stipulate to the
damages that would be suffered in the event of a breach by specifying
the amount in the contract. The difficulty with the liquidated dam-
ages argument is that it is inappropriate in the context of a general
social "damage," such as drug trafficking. The Uniform Commercial
Code, in dealing with liquidated damages in contracts for sale, states
that such liquidation provisions are only enforceable "at an amount
which is reasonable in light of the actual or anticipated harm caused
by the breach .... A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated dam-
ages is void as a penalty. '235 Thus, in order to constitute liquidated
damages, forfeiture must be "reasonable" in light of the harm
suffered.
How can a price be put on the actual "damage" the government
suffers by an individual breach of the narcotics laws? The specific
damages attributable to the specific act in question are almost impos-
sible to ascertain. Even "when definite, [they are] so vast, that the...
theory serves to define nearly any monetary exaction as merely com-
pensatory. ' 236  If forfeiture is meant to be compensatory, then the
courts should attempt to tie the expenses caused by the violation and
232. United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto, 272 U.S. 321, 339 (1926) (Butler, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
233. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
234. Id. at 687 n.26 (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones with approval). Section 881 does
specifically provide for the partial return of proceeds from forfeitures to the local law
enforcement agencies that assisted in the seizure and commencement of the forfeiture action,
as well as to a general federal fund maintained for that purpose. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(3) (1988).
There is no doubt that the policing of the drug laws is costly. Presumably, though, the
government undertakes to enforce the drug laws on behalf of the public at large.
Theoretically, the public "compensates" the government for public goods, such as police
protection, through uniformly imposed taxes, not random forfeitures.
235. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1990) (emphasis added).
236. Clark, supra note 16, at 470. Professor Clark adds: "Doubtless, where the
government sues in a purely proprietary role-for example, as party to a breached contract or
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the harm suffered from it in the particular case, to the forfeiture
incurred. Any excess over what would make the government
"whole" must be something other than compensation. However,
through the operation of the "taint" doctrine, the value of the particu-
lar item to be forfeited is merely fortuitous. 237 The government often
may gain a windfall by forfeiting extremely valuable property based
on minor violations,238 such as where a $20,000 yacht is forfeited
because of the presence of one or two marijuana cigarettes,239 or
where a Porsche 91 IS is forfeited for .226 grams of marijuana.240 Pos-
session of these minute amounts of marijuana most often is a misde-
meanor, usually punishable by a relatively minor fine, if an action is
pursued against the person at all.241 Thus, proportionality appears to
be no part of the civil forfeiture doctrine. Once again, it begins to
look as if the purpose of civil forfeiture is to exact a penalty for illegal
behavior. When a forfeiture is incurred as a result of prohibited activ-
ity, the cost, theoretically at least, falls "uniquely on the lawbreak-
as owner of damaged property-the damages recovered are compensatory in the traditional
legal sense." Id
237. The value of property for which the government seeks forfeiture is not fortuitous to the
extent that law enforcement officers and. prosecutors exercise their discretion in seizing and
seeking forfeiture of property. In light of this discretion, it may not be an accident that the
asset sought to be forfeited is very valuable. For obvious reasons, the government is more
likely to seek forfeiture of expensive rather than inexpensive cars. Given the government and
law enforcement agencies' vested interest in the acquisition of property through the operation
of section 881(e)(3), the forfeiture of valuable property appears to be anything but fortuitous.
238. Remarkably, one court has held that the punishment of civil forfeiture is proportionate
to the crime.
The effect of a forfeiture under § 1963 [RICO] is the functional equivalent of a
forfeiture in rem ... The magnitude of the forfeiture is directly keyed to the
magnitude of the defendant's interest in the enterprise conducted in violation of
law. Accordingly, we conclude that it is not cruel and unusual punishment in the
constitutional sense.
United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir. 1980).
The sense one gets from reading this passage is that the punishment fits the crime. That is
clearly not the case with respect to civil forfeiture. See United States v. One 1982 28' Int'l
Vessel, 741 F.2d i319 (11th Cir. 1984) (vessel subject to forfeiture on the basis of "a twig and
two leaves" of marijuana). The court in Grande merely states that it is forfeiting only the
defendant's interest, as opposed to that of any third parties. It does not say that this is an
appropriately proportional punishment with respect to the crime.
239. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 693 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
240. United States v. One Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1979).
241. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 701 (1965) for a
criticism of this aspect of the forfeiture laws. Not surprisingly, forfeiture has more utility than
the criminal sanction as a method of funding law enforcement activities. Criminal fines may
not even compensate the government for the cost of the prosecution. Civil forfeitures, on the
other hand, not only offer an increased recovery, but simultaneously promise a less costly
procedure, because none of the criminal procedural protections apply.
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ers. '' 242 This seems to impose what Professor Packer has called a
"crime tariff."243 But, is this really the purpose of the laws, criminal
and civil, against drugs? Accepting the revenue argument means that
the government is, in effect, taxing drugs. This conclusion leaves
open the question of the purpose in criminalizing drugs at all. Can
the prospect of the government earning huge amounts of money from
the drug trade, through random and arbitrary forfeitures, be less
unsavory than the idea of legalized, controlled drugs subject to a uni-
form governmental tax?
Even if one takes the view that the compensation justification
may encompass punitive fees or fines, it is a very strange "fine" that
today is $100,000, tomorrow $10,000, and next week a million dol-
lars-all for the same violation. In Solem v. Helm,244 the Court stated
that the "principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the
crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law juris-
prudence. ' 24 - It is not enough to say that the criminal requirement of
proportionality does not apply because this is a civil action. Even a
compensation argument requires a nexus between the damages and
the harm suffered. Because the government should not ask random
citizens to underwrite or defray the costs of enforcing the laws, costs
that are supposed to be borne by society as a whole,24 the compensa-
tion arguments fail.
3. NEGLIGENCE
A third rationale advanced for civil forfeiture is the so-called
"negligence" standard. The Court invoked this standard in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 7 The negligence argument
asserts that forfeiture induces due care on the part of the owner who
lends or sells property to another who engages in criminal behav-
ior.248 If the owner has not taken the proper care to see that his prop-
erty is not put to an illegal use, then, the rationale goes, perhaps he
242. Clark, supra note 16, at 467 (discussing the Court's decision in Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938) which held that a 50% "additional tax" was not a penalty, and thus did
not implicate the double jeopardy clause).
243. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 277-82 (1968). "The crime
tariff is what the seller must charge the buyer in order to monetize the risk he takes in breaking
the law." Wisotsky, supra note 60, at 894.
244. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
245. Id at 284 (recidivist, previously convicted of -six non-violent felonies, received
excessive sentence of life imprisonment for issuing a bad check for $100).
246. In Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922), the Court stated: "The mere use of the word
'tax' in an act primarily designed to define and suppress crime is not enough to show that
within the true intendment of the term a tax was laid." Id. at 561-62 (citations omitted).
247. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
248. Id. at 687-88.
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"deserves" the punishment of forfeiture. This argument is reminis-
cent of Blackstone's justification for deodand. 249 It is an argument
with some appeal if one's vision of what occurs in most of these cases
is either that the owner is in complicity with the criminal or is deliber-
ately looking the other way, such as when one buys an expensive
watch at a ridiculously low price from a man on the street in a rain-
coat. Unfortunately, the caselaw does not articulate any concrete
standard of "due care." All that has been said, therefore, is that some
theoretical level exists beyond which the exaction of forfeiture would
be unconstitutional.
In enunciating the "negligence" standard, the Calero-Toledo
Court wrote:
It... has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the consti-
tutional claim of an owner whose property . . . had been taken
from him without his privity or consent. Similarly, the same might
be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in
and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of
his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to con-
clude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly
oppressive.
250
This is the passage that established the modem "negligence"
approach in civil forfeitures. The statement is somewhat mystifying,
as the Court did not specifically say in what way Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Company, the owner of the forfeited yacht, failed to do "all that
reasonably could be expected" in investigating the lessees responsible
for bringing the marijuana on board. 25 ' The Court did not discuss
what Pearson did, or failed to do, that justified the forfeiture. Indeed,
the vast majority of the opinion deals with rationalizations of why the
Court need not deal with the question of the company's behavior on
the grounds that it is an in rem proceeding.25 2 The opinion leaves one
wondering how negligence is deterred by imposing punishment with-
out regard to whether any negligence occurred.
As the Court suggested in the above passage, it makes no sense to
discuss inducing "due care" if it would be ineffectual, as in the case
249. For a case that approves of forfeiture as a penalty for negligence in wrongful death
cases, see State v. One 1986 Subaru, 553 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1989) (forfeiture
sought of car that caused a person's death during a drag race), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 120
N.J. 310, 576 A.2d 859 (N.J. 1990). We seem to have come full circle.
250. Id. at 689-90 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
251. Because the Court announced the negligence argument in Calero-Toledo, it is not
surprising that there was no discussion of any facts relating to the reasonableness of the
company's behavior because they could have hardly known it was such a relevant issue.
252. Id at 680-88.
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where property is obtained by theft or fraud. In distinguishing the
case of an owner whose property is taken without his "privity or con-
sent," the Court relied on a similar statement in J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-
Grant Co. v. United States,25 3 in which the Court reserved ruling on
the question.2"4 Yet, in Beaudry v. United States,255 decided after
Goldsmith-Grant, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld the forfeiture of a vehicle where it appeared to be
undisputed that the violator had obtained the vehicle in question from
the claimant by fraud.25 6 In denying the claimant's argument that he
should be exempted from forfeiture because his property was obtained
from him through fraud, the court distinguished the case of a vehicle
obtained through trespass or theft, from one obtained through fraud
in a contract for sale. Because fraud in a contract makes the contract
voidable, it gives the injured party an election of either enforcing the
contract, or asking for damages from the party who defrauded him.257
Thus, the court found that the claimant's cause of action was against
the purchaser who had used a false name, not against the government
in the forfeiture action.25 8
In light of Beaudry, it is unclear just what standard of care a
claimant must establish in order to qualify for "innocent owner" pro-
tection. How could the claimant in Beaudry be said to have truly
"consented" to give possession of the car to someone who used a false
name to secure that possession? In what manner could the claimant
have defended himself against such fraud? Was his failure to discover
the fraud negligent? Perhaps. It is even possible that he colluded
with the purchaser. However, in the absence of guidance as to what
constitutes "reasonable care" on the part of an owner so as to qualify
for "innocent owner status" and avoid the imputation of negligence,
the lower courts have tended to interpret the negligence standard as a
rule of "when in doubt, the government wins," and to uphold forfeit-
ures on questionable facts.25 9
253. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
254. Id. at 512.
255. 79 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1935).
256. Id. at 651. In Beaudry, a lienholder challenged the forfeiture because the car's
purchaser, later found to have illegally transported liquor, used a false name. The lienholder
argued that this misrepresentation was tantamount to a theft which entitled him to escape
forfeiture. Id at 650.
257. Id. at 651.
258. Id No doubt the reassurance that he had a cause of action against the buyer for fraud
was small comfort to the hapless seller/claimant, because the remedy the court was proposing
was likely to be illusory.
259. See, e.g., United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft, 671
F.2d 414, 418 (10th Cir. 1982) (Illinois resident who acquired airplane located in New Mexico
in payment of a debt could not contest the forfeiture because "complete inattentiveness" for
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Negligence is a tort concept. Given that punitive damages are
available in tort, establishing tort as a sort of private cause of action
against crime, what makes the element of punishment in a civil forfei-
ture so objectionable? The answer is that a tort action is one against a
person, not a thing, and for the imposition of punitive damages the
person's state of mind matters. "Fault" matters. In a tort case, the
defendant's actions are evaluated and those actions must be proven to
be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.2 60 Furthermore,
punitive damages are only available upon a showing of a "willful,"
"wanton" or "reckless" conduct by the defendant. 261 The defendant's
conduct and intent are legally relevant. It is not enough, for the
imposition of punitive damages, to establish mere fault; rather, fault
must be tied to some state of mind, like malice, or to some degree of
negligence which is considered its constructive equivalent.262 Both of
these notions involve judging the conduct and the actions of the per-
son accused. By contrast, the personification fiction dictates that the
culpability of the individual is irrelevant to the imposition of the civil
forfeiture penalty. This irrelevance is not offset merely by holding
that some hypothetical innocent owner could be exempted if, in prac-
tice, no one qualifies for that status.
If forfeiture is exacted from those who have not been guilty of
any negligence, it is unclear what sort of deterrent effect it has on
negligent behavior. "[W]here the forfeiture performs no real function
of prevention or incapacitation, it is difficult to see this requirement of
a guarantee of the behavior of the user as anything but arbitrary and
over six months failed to meet the Calero-Toledo negligence standard); United States v. One
Single Family Residence ("Alvarez"), 683 F. Supp. 783, 789 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("reasonable"
bonding company would have apprised itself of the charges against defendant, presumably
leading it to reject the home as collateral for a bond). But see United States v. One 1981
Datsun 280ZX, 644 F. Supp. 1280, 1287-88 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (father was not negligent in failing
to tell his daughter not to use his car for illegal purposes because he had no reason to believe
she would do so).
260. See Zwier, "Cause in Fact" in Tort Law--A Philosophical and Historical Examination,
31 DE PAUL L. REV. 769, 769 (1982) ("Under traditional tort analysis, 'cause in fact' has long
been an essential element in finding a defendant liable for a plaintiff's injury. The cause in fact
requirement has been essential not only to negligence theory, but also to the growth of strict
liability theory ....") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
261. RFsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979). "Punitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others ...." Commentary to the Restatement explains:
Since the purpose of punitive damages is not compensation of the plaintiff but
punishment of the defendant and deterrence, these damages can only be awarded
for conduct for which this remedy is appropriate-which is to say, conduct





hence violative of due process. 2 6 3 The "negligence" approach turns
civil forfeiture into a form of strict liability for drug violations, and
lessors into the guarantors of their lessees' behavior. In fact, it is
something worse than strict liability because even there the plaintiff
has the burden of proof. As one commentator has noted,
[I]t is unfair and impractical to make a lender or seller a surety for
the good behavior of a borrower or buyer .... The rules... invite
or demand discrimination [by the lender or the seller] against per-
sons with criminal records or reputations, extending their punish-
ment capriciously and making their reintegration into society more
difficult.
264
Because of the lower standard of proof, which only requires the
government to show probable cause to justify forfeiture, civil forfei-
ture is also a form of strict liability for possible drug violations. In his
dissent in Calero-Toledo, Justice Douglas wrote that this "traditional
forfeiture doctrine cannot at times be reconciled with the fifth amend-
ment. 2 65  Accordingly, the negligence argument is insufficient also.
IV. THE IMPACT OF CIVIL FORFEITURE DOCTRINE IN THE
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE CONTEXT
The preceding Sections have demonstrated that there is neither
historical nor rational support, consistent with anything but the ple-
nary exercise of power, for retaining civil forfeiture's personification
fiction. Thus, the abridgement of civil liberties in the civil forfeiture
context is unjustified. As obnoxious as this doctrine is in its civil
form, however, its application in the criminal context is, if possible,
more offensive. In the criminal context, reliance on the label "civil"
to justify the absence of constitutional protections is absent. Never-
theless, the central concepts informing the civil forfeiture doctrine,
"taint" and relation-back, as well as many of the procedural forms,
have been imported to the criminal forfeiture statutes266-with grim
results. More generally, subsection 853(o), the federal criminal forfei-
ture statute, provides that "[t]he provisions of this section shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. "267 This Sec-
263. Clark, supra note 16, at 481.
264. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CPiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 426-27
(1988). The article's subject is criminal forfeiture, but its argument applies with equal force to
civil forfeiture and indeed addresses the Calero-Toledo standard of care.
265. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 693 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
266. "[Criminal forfeiture] was entangled at its birth in procedures drawn from the
inappropriate model of civil forfeiture." Fried, supra note 264, at 434.
267. 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (1988) (emphasis added). This guideline is in direct conflict,
however, with the notion sometimes expressed in the civil forfeiture area that forfeitures must
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tion sets forth a sampling of some of the problems with the applica-
tion of civil forfeiture concepts in the area of criminal forfeiture.
A. Third-Party Claimants in Criminal Proceedings
Procedurally, third-party claimants to property in a criminal for-
feiture proceeding get the worst of both worlds. The post-adjudica-
tory proceeding, which is their only remedy, is basically a civil
forfeiture with a new face. 268 As in civil forfeitures, the burden is on
the claimant to prove that he is either an innocent owner, or a bona-
fide purchaser for value. 269 He must prove that status by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 270  However, because the items to be forfeited
are part of the indictment in the criminal proceeding-that is, part of
what the government must plead and prove against the defendant-
the third-party claimant only enters the proceeding after a forfeiture
judgment has already been rendered against the criminal defendant on
be "strictly construed," as they are "historically disfavored." United States v. $38,000.00 in
United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1547 (1 1th Cir. 1987) ("Forfeitures are not favored in
the law; strict compliance with the letter of the law by those seeking forfeiture must be
required."); United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander, 671 F.2d 414, 417 (10th
Cir. 1982) ("Forfeitures are clearly not favored and are to be enforced only when within both
the spirit and the letter of the law.") (citing United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U.S.
(1939)); United States v. One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir. Unit B
May 1981) ("As a general rule, forfeiture is not favored, and statutes providing for forfeiture
are strictly construed.") (citations omitted). Despite this language, one is hard pressed to find
many examples in which the courts have disfavored forfeiture. In all but one of the above
examples, forfeiture was upheld despite the purportedly "strict construction" given to the
statute. But see United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 893 F.2d 1245, 1251 (1 1th Cir.
1990) (forfeitures not favored and should be enforced only if within spirit and letter of the
law), vacated en banc, 902 F.2d 24 (1990).
268. Third parties with interests in property that has been determined forfeitable in a prior
criminal proceeding have the burden, just as in the civil forfeiture context, of proving their
innocence in any wrongdoing. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) (1988) (requires the claimant to
establish "by a preponderance of the evidence" that his claim is valid). In general, the
procedural structure is also the same. See, e.g., § 853(n)(l)-(7) (entitled "Third party
interests"). The statute specifically directs that "[e]xcept to the extent that they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this section, the provisions of section 881 of this title shall
apply to a criminal forfeiture under this section. 21 U.S.C. § 8530) (emphasis added). Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), establishes that "[a]ll right, title, and
interest in property described in subsection (a) [of this section] vests in the United States upon
the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section." This is the relation-back
concept stemming from the "taint" doctrine in civil forfeiture. See supra notes 21-30 and
accompanying text. Professor Fried argues:
By invalidating most third-party transfers after the commission of the offense
giving rise to forfeiture, and putting the burden on the transferee to prove, not
just his good faith, but his ignorance of the transferor's criminal activities, the
CFA in effect established a new class of collateral civil forfeitures.
Fried, supra note 264, at 349-50.
269. See supra note 6.
270. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) (1988).
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the same property. In some circumstances, this prior judgment of for-
feiture represents a more egregious burden on the third-party claim-
ant than the finding of probable cause to forfeit in the true civil
forfeiture context because it presumably was rendered only after
meeting the higher burden of proof required in the criminal trial.27'
Theoretically, this prior judgment ought to operate as collateral
estoppel against the claimant, since in order to prove its case that
property is forfeitable, the government ought to show that the prop-
erty to be forfeited belonged-in the first instance-to the defendant,
and do so "beyond a reasonable doubt." However, the government
does not need to prove the defendant's ownership because subsection
853(d) creates a rebuttable presumption that all of a defendant's prop-
erty is forfeitable.272 Thus, all the government must do is list in the
indictment or information all of the property it believes belongs to the
defendant and is forfeitable under the statute. If a defendant does not
testify, or if he does not adequately overcome this presumption, then
the government has not really proven this element "beyond a reason-
able doubt; 2 73 it has only received a default judgment by virtue of the
defendant's failure to prove non-ownership or non-forfeitability. Nev-
ertheless, the judgment of forfeiture that the third-party claimant
must overturn is a judgment. Thus, in addition to the presumption
271. Section 853(d) creates a rebuttable presumption, in the criminal proceeding, that "any
property of a person convicted of a felony under this subchapter" is subject to forfeiture. 21
U.S.C. § 853(d) (1988). The government must prove forfeitability by a preponderance of the
evidence in order to invoke this presumption. As a practical matter, this means that, like in
the context of parallel civil forfeiture proceedings, the defendant must testify if he wants to
claim his property because he cannot rebut the presumption by remaining silent. See supra
note 50. He cannot, however, dispute this presumption with testimony without waiving his
right to remain silent. The defendant has little incentive to testify even if the property is his.
He has even less if it is not. Thus, the interests of third-party claimants and criminal
defendants are often adverse at trial. Because of the statutory bar on intervention, however,
third-party claimants have no opportunity to challenge this presumption at the criminal trial.
See 21 U.S.C. § 853(k) (1988). Despite the third-party claimant's lack of opportunity to be
heard, section 853(n)(5) specifically directs the court to "consider the relevant portions of the
record of the criminal case which resulted in the order of forfeiture," for purposes of the third-
party, post-adjudicatory proceeding. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(5) (1988).
272. The subsection reads in full:
There is a rebuttable presumption at trial that any property of a person
convicted of a felony under this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter is
subject to forfeiture under this section if the United States establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that -
(1) such property was acquired by such person during the period of the
violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter or within a
reasonable time after such period; and
(2) there was no likely source for such property other than the violation of
this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 853(d) (1988).
273. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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created by the statute, the third-party claimant must try to rebut
whatever psychological weight a prior jury verdict of forfeiture car-
ries. But the effect of a prior judgment of forfeiture is not merely
psychological. The government may enter as evidence the transcript
from the criminal proceeding in order to uphold the judgment of for-
feiture,274  requiring the third-party claimant to rebut evidence
presented in an action to which he was not a party and had no oppor-
tunity to cross-examine witnesses.
The government may ask for a pre-trial restraining order 2 7" that
can tie up a claimant's property for years because the claimant is stat-
utorily barred from intervening with his claim until the criminal pro-
ceeding is over.276 It is not unusual for the government to hold
property for over a year before instituting civil forfeiture proceed-
ings. 27 7 But the requirement that a third-party claimant be barred
from intervening until the criminal trial is over stretches this potential
into years. 27" By the time a claimant can be heard, the property is
likely to have been destroyed or deteriorated beyond salvage.279
274. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(5) (1988).
275. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1988) (entitled "Protective orders").
276. 21 U.S.C. § 853(k) (1988) reads:
(k) Bar on interventions
Except as provided in subsection (n), no party claiming an interest in
property subject to forfeiture under this section may -
(1) intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the
forfeiture of such property under this section; or
(2) commence an action at law or equity against the United States
concerning the validity of his alleged interest in the property subsequent to
the filing of an indictment or information alleging that the property is subject
to forfeiture under this section.
277. See, e.g., United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S.
555 (1983) (eighteen month delay between seizure and the institution of the forfeiture
proceeding was not a violation of due process); United States v. U.S. Treasury Bills Totaling
$160,916.25, 750 F.2d 900 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (fourteen month delay did not violate due process);
United States v. One Single Family Residence ("Alvarez"), 683 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(6 month delay permitted); United States v. M/V Christy Lee, 640 F.Supp. 667 (S.D. Fla.
1986). But see United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193 (C.D. Cal.
1978) (sixteen month delay precluded forfeiture).
278. A Florida newspaper reported that a retired couple had their property tied up in a
criminal forfeiture case for three years. Katel, Forfeiture, Miami Rev., Mar. 6, 1990, at 1, col.
2. The couple had financed the sale of their building themselves, with the intention that the
buyer's mortgage payments would act as their retirement income. Id. Unfortunately, their
purchaser was apparently involved in drug trafficking. Id at 4, cols. 1 & 3. The government
seized the property and the buyer stopped making the payments. Id. Now, the couple cannot
sell the building, rent it to anyone else, or in any other way recover their stream of income.
Perhaps most importantly, they are not even able to settle these issues by proving their
innocence until the criminal proceedings are over.
279. See, e.g., United States v. One 1983 Homemade Vessel Named "Barracuda," 858 F.2d
643 (11 th Cir. 1988) (United States Customs destroyed claimant's vessel while her case was
pending because she failed to post a bond for it pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 62(d)); United
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Finally, the criminal forfeiture statutes also provide that the
hearing requested by a third-party claimant "be held before the court
alone, without a jury.' ' 280 Thus, the statute denies third-party claim-
ants the right to a trial by jury. Although bench trials are the com-
mon practice in the civil forfeiture context, their employment to
enforce a forfeiture under the criminal statute is questionable. This
provision, however, has not gone unchallenged. At least one court
has found it unconstitutional-albeit without explicitly saying so. 2 1
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that this provision was included in the
statute without apparently causing any concern. It appears that
because Congress borrowed the procedural conduct of third-party
claims from the civil forfeiture setting, no one was struck by the prob-
lem. However, it is the operation of the civil forfeiture "taint" con-
cept that is most egregious in the criminal forfeiture setting.282 Here
is where most of the controversy rages.
B. The "Taint" Doctrine and the Criminal Forfeiture Statutes
As has been previously noted, Congress borrowed the "taint"
doctrine from civil forfeiture.283 It may be found in the criminal for-
feiture statutes in subsection 853(c).2 " Although defendants have the
constitutional protections of a criminal proceeding, this concept is
nevertheless harmful to them because of the presumptions it sets
up.285 And, though some people may feel that depriving criminal
States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1987) (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
inadvertently destroyed claimant's guns while his petition for their return was pending after
two years). Although the first case is a civil forfeiture case and the second involves a claimant
who also happened to be the defendant in a criminal action, both cases demonstrate the real
concern that "accidents will happen." The constitutionality of default forfeiture where the
claimant cannot meet the bond requirement is also questionable. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
280. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (1988).
281. In ruling without opinion in an unreported criminal forfeiture case, District Court
Judge Roettger held that a third-party claimant was entitled to a trial by jury. See United
States v. Bachner, No. 87-8028, slip op. at 1, para. 3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 1990). In the civil
forfeiture context, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that a claimant was
entitled to a jury trial. United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir.
1980). The Bachner ruling is appropriate because, as previously noted, the post-adjudicatory
procedures for third-party claimants under the criminal forfeiture statute closely parallels a
civil forfeiture.
282. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
284. Id.
285. There is an argument that the relation-back doctrine is constitutionally infirm because,
among other things, it serves to deprive defendants of their counsel of choice. See Winick,
supra note 18. In addition, the relation-back provision expands the scope of the defendant's
assets accessible through forfeiture. When forfeiture renders a defendant indigent, and
similarly divests his family of their home or other assets in common, it seem factually
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defendants of counsel of choice or bail is desirable, it is difficult to
understand what justifies the imposition of this disastrous concept on
third-party claimants.2 86 It essentially turns any third-party claim to
property, in a post-adjudicatory, criminal proceeding, into a civil for-
feiture proceeding. 2 7 This cannot be appropriate for what is sup-
posed to be a criminal punishment, infficted only after a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.28 ' As Judge Logan of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has noted in a dissent-
ing view, in reference to the use of the "taint" doctrine:
In deciding the constitutional issues presented by this case, we can-
not be carried away by our emotional revulsion to drug dealers and
others who make crime a way of life. The same analysis [relation-
back] that today permits a pre-trial seizure and then a forfeiture of
the property of drug dealers may be applied tomorrow to anyone
who violates federal antitrust laws or laws prohibiting polluting the
water or the air. Indeed, the reasoning of the majority would sup-
port a law forfeiting as of the date of the offense all of a person's
indistinguishable from the "corruption of the blood" laws that were barred by the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
286. Section 853(c) further states:
Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the
defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall
be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a
hearing pursuant to subsection (n) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of
such property who at the time of the purchase was reasonably without cause to
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.
21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
287. Pursuant to section 853(n)(6), third-party claimants asserting an interest in forfeited
property have a burden of proof by the "preponderance of the evidence." 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(n)(6) (1988). A preponderance of the evidence standard is usually applicable only in
civil cases. Furthermore, pursuant to section 8530), the provisions of the civil forfeiture
statute (section 881) apply to section 853 "except to the extent that they are inconsistent with
the provisions of" section 853. 21 U.S.C. § 8530) (1988). Arguably, this provision is
inconsistent with the provision in section 853(d) which requires that the government establish
by a "preponderance of the evidence" at the defendant's trial that an asset listed in the
indictment is subject to forfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(d) (1988). This argument raises two
points: (1) even though this is a rebuttable presumption, the burden of proof on the
government in criminal trials is usually "beyond a reasonable doubt"; and (2) the third-party
claimant thus comes into the post-adjudicatory hearing having to establish a proposition
contrary to that presumably already proven "by a preponderance of the evidence" b y the
government at the criminal trial. Section 853(n)(5) reads in part that "the court shall consider
the relevant portions of the record of the criminal case which resulted in the order of
forfeiture." 21 U.S.C § 853(n)(5) (1988). Therefore, a third-party claimant may confront
testimony without any opportunity to test it by cross-examination, because section 853(n)(5)
only allows the claimant to cross-examine witnesses who "appear at the hearing." Id
288. But see United States v. Ortiz, 910 F.2d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1990) ("We see no reason
why Congress is not free to adopt procedures from an in rem action into an in personam
one.").
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property, for his or her lifetime, for any offense ... 289
To explore the inappropriateness of imposing on the third-party
claimant the application of a civil forfeiture concept that stems from
the notion of a "guilty" property, it is useful to examine its applica-
tion in a particular case, aside from the attorneys' fees cases, such as
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,219 which excite the
most attention.291
In United States v. Mageean,292 a Nevada federal district court
held that the relation-back provision of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") forfeiture statute293 gave the
government title, superior to tort claimants,294 to a defendant's corpo-
rate assets. Thus, in order to have their claims exempted from the
forfeiture order, the tort claimants had to fall under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(/)(6), the bona-fide purchaser for value exception.295
289. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1509 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Logan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court approved and upheld the
central holding in this case, that relation-back can be used to justify pre-seizure restraint of a
defendant's forfeitable assets, even if he or she is deprived of the right to counsel of choice.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
290. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). Some of the predictable excesses resulting from this decision
have already occurred. See United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1990)
(government attorneys used threat of forfeiture of funds that the court had already ordered
repaid to persuade the defendant to plead guilty).
291. It is useful to look at cases other than those involving attorneys' fees because the focus
on the sixth amendment right to counsel creates the temptation to "avoid the constitutional
dilemma[s]" posed by civil forfeitures and to create an exception to the relation-back provision
for attorney fees, see, e.g., Winick, supra note 18, at 838-69, rather than to recognize that the
premise is constitutionally infirm in all of its applications because of its origins in the
personification fiction. Professor Winick argues that the statute should be construed to void
only "sham" transfers to attorneys, not just all sham transfers to third parties, because of the
third parties' constitutional rights. Id.
292. 649 F. Supp. 820 (D. Nev. 1986).
293. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922,
941-948 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)). With respect to the concerns
addressed in this Comment, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and 21 U.S.C. § 853 are indistinguishable.
294. The tort claimants in this case did not have a judgment. The tort action in state court
had been stayed until the district court determined their rights against the assets of the
defendant's company. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. at 821. Conceivably, the case could have been
decided in the same way merely on the basis that the claimants did not have a ripened interest
in defendant's assets because they had not secured a judgment. However, the court indicated
in dicta that the absence of a judgment was irrelevant and that the tort claimants' interests
would not have been protected in any case. Id at 825.
295. Section 1963(l)(6) reads in relevant part:
If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that-
(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such
right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part
because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the
defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the
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Although the court acknowledged that Congress' purpose in enacting
the relation-back provision was to void "sham" transactions, 296 it
found it impossible to torture the definition of bona-fide purchaser for
value so far as to include tort claimants.297 By contrast, the court did
read into the bona-fide purchaser for value section of the statute pro-
tection for trade creditors,298 protection which is not explicitly
there.299  The government argued that section 1963(/)(6) °  only
extended protection to claimants with "legal interests."301 The court
agreed "that only legal interests are recognized" and conceded that
"the trade creditors do not, in a technical sense, have legal interests in
the forfeited property. ' 302 Nevertheless, the court found that trade
creditors were protected because they had dealt with the company at
arms' length and had rendered services for value; thus, the purpose of
the provision would be satisfied.303 The court also noted that
"although the trade creditor's losses may be insignificant in compari-
son to the tort claimants' injuries, the tort claimants were not involved
in an arm's length transaction [with the company] and did not pay
value for their claims.
' '304
This reasoning is a curious reversal of what one would expect.
Tort claimants, because they have not chosen to deal with the defend-
ant company (i.e., they could not have done some sort of investigation
of it), and because they have suffered serious losses, ought to be given
greater protection than trade creditors, rather than less. This result is
time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of property
under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or
interest in the property and was at the time of the purchase reasonably without
cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section ....
18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(6) (1988) (emphasis added).
296. "mhe legislative histories of § 853 and § 1963 show that the purpose of the relation-
back doctrine is to 'close a potential loophole in current law whereby the criminal forfeiture
statute would be avoided by transfers that were not 'arm's length' transactions.'" Mageean,
649 F. Supp. at 824 (citations omitted).
297. "While it is true that their claims were not created through 'sham' transactions, it does
not seem possible to stretch the definition of bona fide purchaser to include the tort claimants."
Id at 824.
298. Id. at 828.
299. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6) grants exemption from forfeiture to bona fide purchasers for
value of "right, title or interest." The statute does not say whether this is meant to apply only
to secured creditors or whether the word "right" is to be interpreted more broadly. However,
as the Mageean court noted, the legislative history seemed to limit this provision to those with
"legal interests." See Mageean, 649 F. Supp. at 828-29.
300. See supra note 296.
301. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. at 828-29.
302. Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 827-31.
304. Id at 826 (emphasis added).
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particularly persuasive given that the operation of the statute is pre-
sumably meant to deter and punish the convicted defendant, not inno-
cent parties. Particularly, with respect to the "negligence" standard
in civil forfeiture, which is often mistakenly invoked in these circum-
stances, there is nothing that the tort claimants could have done to
avoid "doing business" with a criminal. 30 5 The same may not neces-
sarily be true of trade creditors.
One should also remember that the tort claimants were not
denied a remedy because of a superior third-party interest. Their
"rival" for the defendant company's assets was the government. The
convicted defendant is not punished any less because the property
taken from him is given to his victims, rather than the government.
Giving the proceeds of forfeiture to the government, rather than to
the tort claimants, hardly looks like a means to insure "an indemnity
to the injured party," which the Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co. 3°1 offered as a support for the personification fic-
tion. Rather, it turns the government into "a coequal competitor to
the common law owner, akin to a bank fighting with an accused rob-
ber over money allegedly stolen from the bank. 30 7 Unlike the bank,
however,
[t]he government's interest in forfeited property... does not derive
from a common law ownership right to the property, for the gov-
ernment neither owned the property before the crime nor gave
value for the property as a creditor or purchaser does. Forfeiture,
as an exception to the Fifth Amendment's requirement that prop-
erty shall not be taken for public use without "just compensation,"
is grounded entirely on public policy. Criminal forfeiture is a pen-
alty to prevent a criminal from profiting from crime or from retain-
ing the means to commit more crimes, or is in the nature of a fine, to
punish the criminal.
308
305. As one commentator argues:
Mort claimants, or at least those whose claims do not arise from any
commercial dealings with the defendant, arguably have a stronger claim of
priority than contract claimants, because they are not subject to suspicions about
their good faith or the reasonableness or propriety of their dealing with
criminals.
Fried, supra note 264, at 426.
306. 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974) (citing United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
210, 238 (1844)).
307. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1510 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Logan, J.,
dissenting).
308. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Significantly, Judge Logan does not
designate the type of forfeiture that it is an exception to the fifth amendment's takings clause.
Furthermore, to the extent that "public policy" is difficult to distinguish from "public use"-
arguably, property taken in furtherance of a public policy would seem to have been taken for a
public use--the argument fails to convince. The preceding sections suggest that civil forfeiture
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It is difficult to see how depriving tort claimants of a remedy
advances the government's interest in deterring crime or punishing
the criminal. Moreover, it is significant that the Mageean court did
not discuss the fact that the statute also provides for restitution to the
victims of the convicted criminal from the proceeds of the forfei-
ture,3°9 albeit such restitution is given entirely at the discretion of the
Attorney General. a1 ° It is not irrational to argue that the presence of
this provision indicates Congressional intent to compensate these vic-
tims whenever they can be identified. Instead, the Mageean court
noted:
[P]rior to the 1984 amendments, there was no judicial remedy for
any third party claiming interest in forfeited property. Since Con-
gress could choose to provide no judicial remedy it is not unconsti-
tutional for Congress to provide a remedy only for certain
claimants even though this choice leads to disparate treatment of
different classes of claimants .... 311
Arguably, the Mageean court has it backwards. A more persuasive
argument as to the 1984 amendments, which added the protection to
bona-fide purchasers, is that Congress amended the statutes to include
this protection to innocent parties precisely because it realized that
the statutes were constitutionally infirm without such protection, and
that Congress did not have the power to enact such a statute.3a 2
is also intended to prevent a criminal from profiting from crime, or from retaining the means
to commit more crimes. Although Judge Logan neatly avoids the issue, clearly this passage
could be lifted out of its context and applied to civil forfeitures without diminishing its
applicability.
309. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(i) (1988). This section, entitled "Authority of the Attorney
General," reads in part as follows:
With respect to property ordered forfeited under this section, the Attorney
General is authorized to -
(1) grant petitions for mitigation or remission of forfeiture, restore forfeited
property to victims of a violation of this subchapter, or take any other action to
protect the rights of innocent persons which is in the interest ofjustice and which is
not inconsistent with the provisions of this section ....
Id. (emphasis added).
Section 1963 contains a similar provision. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(g) (1988). Arguably, these
provisions reflect congressional intent to compensate tort claimants from the proceeds of the
forfeiture because they could not have been knowingly "dealing" with a criminal; moreover,
the criminal is not punished any less when the property taken from him is given to the tort
claimants, rather than to the government.
310. Since the law enforcement and prosecution arms of the government have an interest in
the disposition of forfeited assets because of the provision giving them claim to proceeds, see
infra notes 323-29, it is unlikely that victims were often compensated.
311. United States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Nev. 1988) (emphasis added).
312. The Mageean court suggests this:
In enacting subsection (m) [the bona fide purchaser protection in section 1963],
Congress recognized that since criminal forfeiture actions are in personam
proceedings, a forfeiture order would be invalid if it reached a third party's
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V. "TREATING THE SYMPTOMS"
Whatever one's private beliefs about the nature of the legislative
process, one must assume, as a threshold matter, that Congress' aims
are worthy when it passes measures that are designed to control,
deter, or punish drug trafficking. However, this does not mean that
the courts should abdicate their responsibility to ensure that the
means chosen by Congress pass constitutional muster. Forfeiture,
with its disregard of personal guilt is a utilitarian form of punishment.
Congress' assumption in creating this penalty seems to have been that
proving whether a particular person is guilty of trafficking in narcot-
ics is more costly than necessary because forfeiture will have the salu-
tary benefit for the community of deterring such conduct. Thus
personal liberties are sacrificed to the common good. "Utilitarianism
... justi[fies] the punishment of a person wholly innocent of a crime
in circumstances where it would yield some overall net benefit to the
community."3 3
Congress enacted the drug and RICO civil forfeiture provi-
sions314 principally as measures to punish and deter violations of the
criminal laws. Indeed, if the legislative history is to be taken seri-
ously, these are the central justifications.31 5 One only need look at the
legislative history of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984,316 which made extensive changes to both the existing criminal
and civil forfeiture statutes, to confirm Congressional intent.31 7 It is
interest in property which was either exclusive of or superior to the interest of the
defendant....
649 F. Supp. at 823.
It is not clear why, if the tort claimants had had a valid judgment against the defendant,
that would not have been an interest "superior to the interest of the defendant." As previously
noted, the Mageean court could have simply declined to find a "superior" interest because the
claimants in this case did not have such a judgment. However, it went further and indicated
that an enforceable judgment giving them a "right, title or interest in the forfeited property"
was "simply not the case." Id. at 825.
313. Spjut, supra note 46, at 199.
314. There are several other areas in which forfeiture is one of the punishments for a
violation of a particular law. Although this Comment is primarily concerned with drug-
related forfeitures, it is worth noting other civil forfeiture statutes because many of the
arguments made here apply to these provisions as well. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1988); 19
U.S.C. §§ 1590, 1594, 1595(a), 1597 (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1703 (1988). This is by no means an
exhaustive list.
315. See supra notes 61-64 & 170 and accompanying text.
316. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). Section 301 of the law is entitled the
"Comprehensive Forfeiture Act" ("CFA"). Id. at 2040. See supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
317. "Clearly if law enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to
be successful, they must include an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture
is the mechanism through which such an attack may be made." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 44,
at 191 (emphasis added).
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riddled with references to forfeiture as "a powerful weapon in the
fight against drug trafficking and racketeering."318
Given the crime deterrence purpose, Congress' aims might be
more tolerable, if no less unconstitutional, if the statutes worked.
There is little indication, however, that forfeiture is having a sufficient
deterrent effect on the drug problem to justify its imposition. Con-
gress is treating the symptoms rather than the disease. Perhaps if,
rather than giving the proceeds of forfeiture over to the law enforce-
ment agencies, these proceeds were directed toward drug rehabilita-
tion or work programs, even draconian forfeiture laws would seem
less offensive. 319 But such is not the case. In its frenzy to eradicate
the drug problem, Congress has expanded some of the concepts
embodied in civil forfeiture, such as "relation-back," into the rela-
tively new criminal forfeiture statutes.32 ° Because those concepts rely
upon the personification fiction to avoid constitutional scrutiny, their
application in this area is particularly disturbing.32' Indeed, it is part
of an overall abridgement of civil liberties that is occurring with
respect to the drug problem-the "drug exception.
3 22
318. Id
319. It is far from clear that drug rehabilitation programs or the like would be any more
effective than civil forfeiture at solving the drug problem.
320. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988) (relation-back provision borrowing "taint" concept from
civil forfeiture); 21 U.S.C. § 8530) (1988) (applying section 881-civil forfeiture statute-to
section 853 "[e]xcept to the extent that they are inconsistent"); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (1988)
(no jury for third-party claimants). Congress erroneously thought that it was doing something
new, and possibly on the edge of permissible constitutional limits, when it enacted the criminal
forfeiture statutes in the first place. See Hughes & O'Connell, In Personam (Criminal)
Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition into a
Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613, 621 (1984) ("When enacted by Congress,
these [criminal forfeiture] provisions were perceived to be a bold and innovative approach to
attack the economic base of criminal activity. . . ."); see also Note, supra note 24, at 794-96.
Congress was wrong. Such statutes had been enacted and sporadically applied in the early
part of the last century for crimes generally until they were considered barred by the
constitutional prohibition on Bills of Attainder or by 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1988). See Note, supra
note 24, at 779-92. In addition, the Confiscation Acts of 1862, 12 Stat. 589 (1862), repealed by
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1153, calling for the forfeiture of property belonging to
confederate sympathizers, were passed only after narrowly escaping a presidential veto because
Lincoln thought that they were unconstitutional. Id. at 787.
321. "As ... the CCE necessarily implicates the constitutional standards applicable to the
criminal justice system, requiring proof of guilt prior to forfeiture .... resort to civil forfeiture
cases as guidance in criminal forfeiture cases, [is] highly dubious to say the least of it." United
States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
322. See generally Wisotsky, supra note 60. Another troubling aspect of this phenomena is
the new, stringent mandatory minimum sentences imposed by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986. The law removes judicial discretion in sentencing for distribution and possession of
narcotics, so that even first-time offenders receive sentences of ten years without parole. At
least one federal judge has called these rules "unjust," commenting, "It behooves us to think
that it may profit us very little to win the war on drugs if in the process we lose our soul." See
Taylor, Ten Years for Two Ounces, AM. LAW., Mar. 1990, at 65, 66-68.
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There is a further problem with the civil forfeiture statutes. The
current law allocates up to ninety percent of the proceeds from drug-
related forfeitures to be returned to the local law enforcement agen-
cies. 323 These agencies have an incentive to urge forfeiture actions
because they have a stake in them to the extent that forfeiture funds
their budgets.324 The stake these agencies have in the outcome of the
proceeding may explain the dramatic increase in the number of forfei-
ture actions brought and the amounts collected.325 In addition, some-
times these agencies simply keep the property forfeited. For example,
law enforcement agencies use forfeited luxury cars and boats in
undercover "sting" operations. Worse, sometimes these properties
are improperly put to personal use by law enforcement personnel.326
This situation hardly resembles the Calero-Toledo Court's characteri-
zation327 of drug-related seizures as "not initiated by self-interested
parties, ' 328 in order to escape the requirements of notice and hearing
323. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(l)(A) (1988).
324. See Fried, supra note 264, at 360-66. Professor Fried notes that "Assets Forfeiture
Fund income for fiscal year 1986 totalled $93,711,430." Id at 365 n.167 (citation omitted).
He also notes that another institutional incentive for seeking forfeiture is that "[t]he dollar
value of forfeited property becomes a convenient way to measure the success of enforcement
efforts in general and to distinguish between the performance of individual officers." Id. at
362.
This effect is not limited to the federal government. For one thing, the forfeiture statutes
authorize payments of proceeds from forfeitures to go to "any State or local law enforcement
agency which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture .. " 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A)
(1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853(i)(4) (1988) (referring to Attorney General's authority to dispose of
proceeds obtained under § 853 "in accordance with the provisions of 881(e)"). Second, to the
extent that the states have enacted similar laws, see infra note 331, the incentive effect is
experienced throughout the law enforcement community. Indeed, at least one enterprising
locality in Missouri, allows law enforcement agencies to bypass a forfeiture proceeding and
simply require the owner to pay a certain sum to get his property released. See Osborne, Police
State, The Riverfront Times, Dec. 12-18, 1990, at 1. The procedure is called a "compromise,
settlement and release." Id at 11. Police and prosecutors establish the settlement amount at
their discretion. Id. According to one defense attorney, the process goes something like this:
"They say, 'Hey, this looks like a nice-looking car; you look like you've got some money; let's
call it $2,500." Id. While this procedure is apparently not universally available to law
enforcement agencies in the state, id at 12, the article notes that proceeds from drug-related
seizures and forfeitures in St. Louis County have increased from $735.29 in 1983, to
$279,697.97 in 1990 through August. Id at 10.
325. See supra note 66.
326. Some examples of forfeited property converted to personal, albeit purportedly
"official" use, are cited in Winn, supra note 55, at 1111, 1128 (citing GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL CONTROL-DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION'S
USE OF FORFEITED PERSONAL PROPERTY (Dec. 10,1986) (report to Sen. Lawton Chiles)).
327. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
328. Id. at 679. It is open to question whether, even in Calero-Toledo, the government
officials were not "self-interested." In the opinion, Justice Brennan notes: "It is agreed that
the yacht was appraised at a value of $19,800 and that the Chief of the Office of Transportation
of the Commonwealth purports to maintain possession of the yacht as legal owner." Id. at 668
n.4. In the opinion, this is characterized as "official use." Id. at 668. One wonders why the
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laid down in Fuentes v. Shevin. 329
Finally, as is so often the case, the states have followed the fed-
eral government's lead in enacting "tough" forfeiture laws, with pre-
dictable results.33° Over forty states have some type of forfeiture law,
either civil, or civil and criminal, many of them patterned after the
federal statutes.331  Supporting strict drug control laws and punish-
ments apparently is just as popular and politically fail-proof for state
legislators as it is for members of Congress. Given this political cli-
mate, claimants in the state courts (where judges are often elected, not
appointed) are unlikely to fare any better then those in federal
court.332 Furthermore, to the extent that a state's statute mirrors the
federal statutes, federal caselaw represents precedent that is highly
persuasive, if not binding.333 These factors combine to suggest that
"Office" of the chief was not claiming ownership. Certainly if the chief used the yacht for
personal purposes, the forfeiture would appear to be "self-interested." Compare United States
v. Hernandez, 911 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1990) (police instituted a forfeiture action on the jewelry
claimant was wearing when arrested).
329. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
330. The state courts have tended to follow the federal courts' lead in interpreting the
forfeiture laws. However, in some of these cases, the existing caselaw has been totally
confused. See, e.g., Florida v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1989).
331. Some states have statutes that are virtually identical to the federal ones. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-112 (1990); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6801 (Purdon 1990). Others have
statutes that are substantially similar but differ in some significant respects. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. §§ 893.12, 932.703-.704 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.270(4), 218A.410
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 94C, § 47 (1990). A third group of statutes
are substantially different than the federal statutes. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:2601-2622 (West Supp. 1991); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 1311 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
332. See Florida v. Crenshaw, 548 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1989). In this case, the issue was
whether the government needed to prove that a nexus existed between the use of a vehicle and
the prohibited conduct for purposes of a forfeiture statute. Id. at 225. It is not clear whether
the case was a civil or criminal forfeiture. For instance, the case is styled as one against a
person as if it were criminal action. Id. at 223. On the other hand, the opinion contains the
following language: "Civil forfeitures of property belonging to defendants convicted of
criminal offenses is not something new." Id. at 225 (emphasis added). This suggests that the
case before the court was a civil forfeiture. It also erroneously suggests that a claimant must
be convicted of a crime before civil forfeiture can be imposed. Finally, the court suggest that
all forfeitures are civil penalties assessed for criminal behavior: "We find that the legislative
message was clear: possessing drugs, even solely for personal use, subjects individuals not only
to criminal penalties but also to forfeiture of the vehicle, boat or aircraft in which drugs are
found." Id. at 226.
Justice Kogan, joined by Justices Shaw and Barkett, vigorously dissented. Id. at 227.
Although he realized that "society's drug-related problems have escalated in recent years,"
Justice Kogan did not believe "that an abandonment of basic legal principles [was] justified."
Id. He further outlined the premise that forfeitures for drug-related crimes were not remedial.
"The purpose of forfeiture is not to make the state 'whole,' but rather it is intended to deter
drug possessors, sellers, and smugglers by seizing their assets and thus penalizing them
financially." Id. at 229.
333. The Florida Constitution, like that of other states, has a "piggy back" provision with
respect to certain constitutional rights, that grafts the federal law onto the state law by
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not only are we in danger of becoming inured to the violation of cher-
ished constitutional rights in this context, but that the forfeiture stat-
utes pose significant dangers of governmental corruption at worst, and
privateering at best.
VI. CONCLUSION
The "demon" has been tracked to its "lair." The historical justi-
fications for the personification fiction of civil forfeiture have been
reviewed and appear irrelevant to modern society. Current justifica-
tions for the doctrine similarly ring hollow. The arguments put forth
by the courts on this issue are weak and singularly unconvincing.
"The modern doctrine of the offending res ... is a deliberate subter-
fuge-a judicial fiction, by resort to which the sovereign, with the
sanction of the courts, can impose a punishment on a blameless indi-
vidual who is thereby deliberately left without recourse to his consti-
tutional rights of due process.
'334
The government's purpose in the passage of such laws is clear-
to wage war on drugs and organized crime. The question is, can it do
so in this fashion? Is this a legitimate exercise of the police power?
The current application of civil forfeiture is repugnant to the values
expressed in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. Our criminal
justice system is principally based on the premise that "[p]unishment
is justified when and to the extent it is deserved for responsible wrong-
doing. ' 33   Thus, an action in which criminal sanctions are applied
without regard to "wrong-doing," and where the constitutional pro-
tections of the criminal process are not afforded to the person so pun-
ished, hardly seems to comport with our notions of justice and fair
play.
There is no doubt that the drug trade, and its associated evils are
a blight on the land. But as one court put it,
We are not unsympathetic to the government's strong desire to
eradicate drug trafficking: we recognize that illegal drugs pose a
tremendous threat to the integrity of our system of government.
We must not forget, however, that at the core of this system lies
the Constitution, with its guarantees of individuals' rights. We
providing that rights under a certain provision of the state constitution will be governed by the
United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the corresponding provision in the federal
Constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1982) ("This right shall be construed in
conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court.").
334. Finkelstein, supra note 35, at 252.
335. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74
CORNELL L.R. 655, 656 (1989) (adopting a retributive Kantian theory of punishment).
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336. United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1548-49 (1 th Cir.
1987). Notably the court does not emphasize the threat to the integrity of our citizens or their
health and well-being, but rather to the "integrity of our system of government." It is a telling
distinction.
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